Aldrich v. National Collegiate Athletic Association

Background

Erin Aldrich, Jessica Johnson, and Londa Bevins alleged that John Rembao engaged in sexual misconduct and other abusive conduct while coaching or recruiting them. They asserted claims against Rembao and against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and its Board of Governors. Their claims against the NCAA defendants included alleged duties to create and enforce rules addressing sexual misconduct, protect student-athletes, and prevent coaches from moving between schools after misconduct. The plaintiffs also alleged that the NCAA defendants were vicariously liable for coaches’ conduct and had ratified Rembao’s misconduct. Beata Corcoran was also a plaintiff; the opinion states that there was no allegation that Rembao coached or abused her.

The NCAA is described as an unincorporated association headquartered in Indiana. Rembao is described as a resident of Santa Cruz, California. The alleged misconduct involving Aldrich occurred in Arizona and Texas, and the alleged misconduct involving Johnson and Bevins principally occurred in Texas. The opinion discusses Rembao’s earlier work at California Polytechnic State University, but concludes that the California contacts did not establish the required connection to the plaintiffs’ claims.

NCAA Defendants’ Motion

The NCAA defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction is a court’s authority over a particular defendant. The court considered both general jurisdiction, which permits a defendant to be sued for claims unrelated to the forum, and specific jurisdiction, which requires the claims to arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.

The court held that the plaintiffs had not shown that the NCAA defendants were sufficiently “at home” in California for general jurisdiction. The NCAA’s California members, prior litigation in California, physical and economic activities in California, tournaments, and alleged control over California members did not make California a uniquely significant forum for the NCAA. The court also held that specific jurisdiction was lacking. The NCAA’s alleged failure to enact appropriate rules occurred at its headquarters in Indiana, and the plaintiffs did not allege that the abuse occurred in California. Rembao’s California contacts, including his work at Cal Poly and his relationship with Sue McNeal, did not sufficiently connect the NCAA defendants to the claims.

Because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the NCAA defendants, it concluded that venue was improper in the Northern District of California. The NCAA defendants conceded that venue and personal jurisdiction were proper in the Southern District of Indiana. The court therefore granted their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and transferred the claims against the NCAA and its Board of Governors to the Southern District of Indiana rather than dismissing those claims outright.

Rembao’s Motion

Rembao argued that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The court agreed that the claims would be untimely without tolling, meaning a legal rule that pauses or extends a filing deadline. But it held that the complaint itself did not establish that the claims were untimely in a way that prevented the plaintiffs from proving tolling.

For Aldrich, the court applied Arizona law after conducting a choice-of-law analysis. It concluded that Arizona’s tolling provision for a person of “unsound mind” was broader than California’s comparable provision and that Arizona had the greater interest because the alleged abuse occurred there. The court held that Aldrich had alleged enough facts to create a dispute about whether she understood her legal rights before recognizing the alleged abuse in 2019. The court therefore denied Rembao’s motion to dismiss Aldrich’s claims as time-barred.

For Johnson and Bevins, the court applied California law concerning equitable tolling. The court held that their allegations about the University of Texas investigation, which allegedly caused them to doubt and minimize what had occurred and to believe they had no legal claim, could support tolling. The court therefore denied Rembao’s motion to dismiss Johnson’s and Bevins’ claims on statute-of-limitations grounds.

Rembao also argued that the plaintiffs had not stated a false-imprisonment claim because they could leave the schools, track meets, and dinners where the alleged conduct occurred and could transfer schools. The court rejected that argument at the motion-to-dismiss stage. It held that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to plausibly show confinement by duress, including allegations that Rembao controlled access to scholarships and workouts, sometimes obstructed access to doors, and caused them to feel unable to leave offices or homes. The court denied Rembao’s motion to dismiss the false-imprisonment claim.

The opinion also states that the plaintiffs conceded that the ratification claim applied only to the NCAA and not to Rembao. The court therefore dismissed that claim as to Rembao.

Disposition

Judge Edward J. Davila granted the NCAA defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and transferred the NCAA-related claims to the Southern District of Indiana. He denied Rembao’s motion to dismiss, including his statute-of-limitations and false-imprisonment arguments, while dismissing the ratification claim against Rembao based on the plaintiffs’ concession. The court ordered the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint removing their claims against the NCAA defendants.