Smith v. Mendoza

Background

Jason Smith, a state prisoner at the Correctional Training Facility, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials and a third-level appeals examiner. The complaint asserted claims for First Amendment retaliation, cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and discriminatory treatment under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Smith alleged that Defendant Perez-Pantoja retaliated against him after Smith threatened to report Perez-Pantoja for watching television while on duty. Smith claimed Perez-Pantoja then searched his cell, damaged or took legal materials, and left the cell in disarray. Smith also alleged that Defendant Mendoza retaliated against him by causing him to be moved to a cell with missing or broken windowpanes. He claimed that Defendants Glaze, Zavala, Ibarra, and Aguirre refused requests to repair the windows or move him, exposing him to cold and wet weather. Smith also asserted a claim against Defendant Sinkovich based on the handling of an administrative appeal.

The defendants moved for summary judgment—a ruling entered when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact important to the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. They argued that Smith had not properly completed the prison grievance process, that his claims failed on the merits, and that qualified immunity protected them from damages. Smith opposed the motion. The court declined to consider four other federal lawsuits that Smith offered as character evidence, but considered the declarations and exhibits submitted with the motion and opposition.

Exhaustion of prison grievances

The Prison Litigation Reform Act generally requires a prisoner to complete available prison grievance procedures before filing a federal action about prison conditions. California’s procedures required an original grievance to identify all involved staff members and describe their involvement, followed by review through the third level.

The court held that Smith had not exhausted his Eighth Amendment claims against Mendoza and Perez-Pantoja. His grievances concerning those defendants focused on retaliation, cell searches, or mail handling and did not give prison officials adequate notice that he was claiming that those defendants were responsible for the defective cell conditions.

The court granted summary judgment as to Ibarra, Aguirre, and Glaze because Smith did not name them as responsible parties in the original grievance. The court also granted summary judgment as to Sinkovich because Smith never separately filed a grievance concerning Sinkovich’s conduct as an appeals reviewer. The court refused to consider new Fourteenth Amendment claims against Ibarra, Aguirre, and Glaze, or a new Eighth Amendment claim against Sinkovich, because Smith raised those claims only in opposition to summary judgment and the complaint did not give fair notice of them.

As to Zavala, Smith acknowledged that the grievance process had not been completed. The court nevertheless found that the process was effectively unavailable because Smith provided evidence that he submitted a grievance about the broken windows and received no response. The court found that two signed interview-request forms supported Smith’s account. It therefore excused exhaustion and denied summary judgment as to Zavala on exhaustion grounds.

Merits of the remaining claims

The court denied summary judgment on Smith’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Perez-Pantoja. The parties offered conflicting evidence about whether Perez-Pantoja knew Smith intended to file a grievance before the cell search and whether the search involved only an authorized search or also trashing the cell and damaging or taking property. Because those disputes could affect whether the conduct was retaliatory, whether it would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising First Amendment rights, and whether it served a legitimate correctional purpose, the court could not resolve the claim at summary judgment. The court also rejected Perez-Pantoja’s qualified-immunity argument because the disputed facts prevented a determination that the conduct was lawful as a matter of law.

The court granted summary judgment on Smith’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Mendoza. Smith alleged that Mendoza caused him to be moved to the defective cell, but Smith conceded that Mendoza had no authority over housing assignments and offered no evidence that Mendoza made the housing decision. The court concluded that Mendoza therefore could not have assigned Smith to the cell as a retaliatory act. The court also stated that Mendoza’s alleged verbal taunting, by itself, was not enough to establish a constitutional violation.

The defendants had not addressed the merits of Smith’s First and Eighth Amendment claims against Zavala. The court therefore denied summary judgment without prejudice as to those claims and granted the defendants permission to file a later summary-judgment motion addressing their merits.

Disposition

The court ordered that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. It was granted as to all claims against Mendoza, Ibarra, Aguirre, Glaze, and Sinkovich; any Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claims against Perez-Pantoja; and any Fourteenth Amendment claim against Zavala. It was denied without prejudice as to Smith’s First and Eighth Amendment claims against Zavala, and denied as to Smith’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Perez-Pantoja. The court set briefing deadlines for any later motion concerning Zavala and directed that the Perez-Pantoja claim be referred for settlement proceedings after the Zavala issue is addressed.