Dana L. v. Kijakazi

Background

Dana L. applied for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning August 21, 2009. The Social Security Administration denied the application initially and again on reconsideration. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Dana L. was not disabled. The Appeals Council declined review.

In an earlier round of this case, the court remanded for the ALJ to reassess Dana L.’s credibility and disability determination in light of new evidence. After another hearing, the ALJ again found that Dana L. was not disabled. The ALJ determined that degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and multiple sclerosis were severe impairments. The ALJ found that Dana L. had the residual functional capacity (RFC)—the most he could still do despite his impairments—to perform light work and could return to his past work as an office nurse.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Dana L. argued that the ALJ improperly rejected his testimony about fatigue and other symptoms based on his employment records, daily activities, and alleged failure to follow treatment. He also argued that the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert (VE) did not include all of his limitations. He asked for payment of benefits or, alternatively, another remand for further proceedings.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the ALJ did not give legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Dana L.’s testimony. Because Dana L. presented medical evidence of impairments that could reasonably cause his symptoms and the ALJ identified no evidence of malingering, the ALJ needed specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting his testimony about the severity of those symptoms.

First, the employment records did not support the ALJ’s conclusion that Dana L.’s work performance problems were unrelated to multiple sclerosis or that he mainly left work to care for his mother. The medical records consistently documented fatigue, mental fog, difficulty multitasking, and concentration problems. The employment records also showed workplace conflicts and a decline in performance around the time Dana L. began taking medical leave for fatigue and other multiple-sclerosis symptoms. The court concluded that the records supported, rather than contradicted, Dana L.’s account.

Second, Dana L.’s daily activities—including driving, yoga movements, dancing, playing guitar, household chores, yard work, reading, and computer use—were not a sufficient reason to reject his testimony. The ALJ did not specifically find that Dana L. spent a substantial part of each day performing activities transferable to a work setting. The record instead showed fluctuating good, intermediate, and bad days, with fatigue, weakness, pain, naps, and difficulty concentrating.

Third, the record did not establish that Dana L. failed to follow a treatment that had actually been prescribed. The evidence showed that doctors discussed possible multiple-sclerosis medications, but it did not show that a particular medication was prescribed. The court also noted that Dana L. explained his concerns about medication, including possible effects related to his past medical history, and that the record did not show medication would have relieved his fatigue. The ALJ therefore lacked substantial evidence for using this issue to reject Dana L.’s testimony.

Finally, the ALJ relied on a vocational expert’s response to a hypothetical that did not include Dana L.’s fatigue and related limitations. The vocational expert testified that a person with the limitations in that first hypothetical could perform office-nurse work. But in response to a later hypothetical that included fatigue-related limits and simple, routine tasks, the expert testified that the person could not perform Dana L.’s past work as an office nurse. Because the first hypothetical was incomplete, the court concluded that the related vocational-expert testimony could not support the ALJ’s decision.

Remedy and Disposition

The court found that the errors affected the core of the disability determination and were not harmless. It concluded that the record was fully developed, that the ALJ had failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Dana L.’s testimony, and that crediting that testimony as true would require a finding of disability. The vocational expert had testified that a person with Dana L.’s combination of limitations could not perform his past work and had no transferable skills.

The court therefore GRANTED Dana L.’s motion for summary judgment, DENIED the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and REMANDED to the Commissioner of Social Security for calculation and award of benefits. The order disposed of Docket Nos. 18 and 21.