Banks-Reed v. United States

Background

Yolanda Banks-Reed and the other plaintiffs, identified as members of the Hebrew Cultural Community, sued the United States. Their complaint, titled “Petition for Reparations,” alleged inhumane treatment and discrimination connected to slavery, racial discrimination, and the government’s failure to pay reparations. They sought $44 million per family, funding to introduce their language into the education system, and an expedited start on legislation addressing discrimination against African Americans.

The court noted that the complaint did not specifically connect the alleged injuries to the plaintiffs. Instead, it primarily included historical information, discussions of religion and culture, summaries of civil-rights events, and descriptions of experiences and statistics concerning African Americans generally.

The government moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which permits dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. The plaintiffs did not timely file their opposition with the court, although they served an opposition on the government. The court nevertheless considered the jurisdictional issues and found that the plaintiffs could not overcome them.

Court’s Analysis

Statute of limitations. The court held that, to the extent the plaintiffs sought reparations for slavery, those claims were barred by the six-year limitations period for civil actions against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). The court concluded that the underlying events described in the complaint occurred more than six years before the action was filed.

Federal Tort Claims Act. The plaintiffs clarified in their opposition that they sought to bring a tort claim. The court explained that money-damages tort claims against the United States must proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which provides only a limited waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity—the general protection that prevents the United States from being sued without its consent.

The court found no indication that the plaintiffs had first presented an administrative claim to a federal agency, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The court stated that the plaintiffs effectively admitted they had not filed such a claim. Because that administrative filing is a jurisdictional prerequisite, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over any Federal Tort Claims Act claims.

The court also concluded that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity for the injuries alleged here because the claims arose from events before January 1, 1945, the statute’s operative date for the relevant waiver. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that their claims accrued only when they reached adulthood, explaining that the claims accrued when the underlying events occurred.

Standing and other possible claims. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that they had suffered a particularized injury based on the generalized harms described in the complaint. Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, the court stated that plaintiffs do not have standing to litigate stigmatizing injuries allegedly suffered by African Americans as a group.

The court also construed the complaint as potentially raising claims under the First Amendment, Bivens, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It held that the United States had not waived sovereign immunity for constitutional damages claims or First Amendment claims directed against the United States. It further explained that Bivens provides a potential remedy against certain federal officers, not the United States itself, and that § 1983 applies to persons acting under state law rather than federal government actors.

Disposition

The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations, by the requirements and limited waiver of the Federal Tort Claims Act, or because the United States had not waived sovereign immunity. It GRANTED the government’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). It dismissed the complaint WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND because amendment would be futile. The court directed the Clerk to terminate the case after entry of a separate judgment.