Duncan v. Walmart, Inc.
- Martinez-Olguin
- 3:24-cv-01525
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In Duncan v. Walmart, Judge Martinez-Olguin granted remand because Walmart did not establish that more than $75,000 was at stake.
Mark Duncan and Walmart, Inc.; the case was sent from federal court to Contra Costa Superior Court.
What happened
In Duncan v. Walmart, Inc., Mark Duncan sued Walmart over injuries from a slip and fall at a Walmart Supercenter in Antioch, California. Walmart removed the case to federal court, relying on diversity jurisdiction.
Duncan asked the court to send the case back to state court, arguing that Walmart had not shown the amount at stake exceeded $75,000. Walmart relied on a $200,000 verbal settlement demand made during a telephone conference.
Judge Araceli Martinez-Olguin granted Duncan’s motion to remand. The court held that Walmart had not shown that a verbal settlement demand qualified under the removal statute to establish federal jurisdiction, ordered the file sent to Contra Costa Superior Court, and closed the federal case.
The detailed version
- Duncan v. Walmart, Inc. · No. 3:24-cv-01525
- Martinez-Olguin
- June 18, 2024
Background
Mark Duncan brought negligence and premises-liability claims against Walmart, Inc. for injuries from a slip and fall at a Walmart Supercenter in Antioch, California. Walmart removed the case to federal court on March 12, 2024, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The removal notice stated that Duncan was a citizen of California, while Walmart was incorporated under Delaware law and had its principal place of business in Arkansas. Walmart also stated that Duncan’s counsel made a verbal settlement demand of $200,000 during a March 1, 2024 telephone conference.
Duncan moved to remand, meaning he asked the federal court to return the case to state court, arguing that federal subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking. The relevant diversity-jurisdiction statute requires the amount in controversy to exceed $75,000 and the parties to be citizens of different states.
Court’s analysis
The court explained that the defendant seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), the 30-day removal period may be triggered by an amended pleading, motion, order, or “other paper” from which removability can first be determined. The court noted that a settlement letter may provide sufficient notice of the amount in controversy, but that the Ninth Circuit had not decided whether verbal settlement communications trigger the removal period.
The court relied on district-court decisions generally holding that oral statements are not an “other paper” for purposes of § 1446(b). It rejected Walmart’s reliance on decisions from other federal circuits because those decisions did not address whether a verbal settlement demand could establish removability under § 1446(b). The court concluded that the statute did not include verbal statements and that Walmart provided no authority showing that removal on that basis was proper.
Disposition
The court held that Walmart had not met its burden to show that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. It therefore concluded that the federal court did not have diversity jurisdiction and granted Duncan’s motion to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Clerk was ordered to transmit the file to Contra Costa Superior Court and close the federal case.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.