Dalton v. Votari

Background

Alvin Henry Dalton, a California prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against M. Votaw, an official at the California Training Facility. The complaint alleged that Votaw violated Dalton’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from harmful prison conditions by failing to place him in a single cell away from secondhand smoke. Dalton alleged that, beginning in September 2021, his cellmate smoked five cigarettes a day.

Votaw moved for summary judgment. Dalton did not file an opposition, but the court explained that it could not grant the motion solely because it was unopposed. The court considered whether the motion and the record showed that no genuine dispute of material fact existed. Dalton’s verified complaint could also serve as evidence when it stated facts based on his personal knowledge and admissible evidence.

Analysis

For an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison conditions, a prisoner must show both an objectively serious deprivation and that the prison official was deliberately indifferent. Deliberate indifference means that the official knew about and disregarded an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health or safety by failing to take reasonable steps to address it.

The court concluded that Dalton had not shown that his exposure to environmental tobacco smoke was objectively serious enough to support an Eighth Amendment claim. In an earlier Supreme Court case involving secondhand smoke, the prisoner’s cellmate smoked five packs of cigarettes a day—twenty times the amount alleged here. The court found no evidence that Dalton experienced a comparable level of danger and no authority establishing that exposure to smoke from a cellmate who smoked five cigarettes a day was contrary to current standards of decency.

The court also held that the evidence did not support a finding that Votaw was deliberately indifferent. Votaw’s evidence showed that she was a grievance administrator, not a medical professional, and that her duties were limited to screening and processing health-care grievances. The evidence further showed that she lacked authority to change Dalton’s housing or cellmate assignment. Votaw informed Dalton that he could submit the issue through the regular grievance process or explain why it should be treated as a health-care matter. The court found no evidence creating a triable issue about whether Votaw deliberately disregarded an unreasonable risk of harm.

Disposition

Judge Jeffrey S. White granted Votaw’s motion for summary judgment on Dalton’s Eighth Amendment claim. The court directed the clerk to enter judgment and close the file.