Duncan v. County of Humboldt

Background

Darcey Lee Duncan sued the County of Humboldt and seven County employees concerning the custodial placement of her nieces, R.K. and N.O., who the complaint identifies as minor tribal members of the Cher-Ae Heights Community of Trinidad Rancheria. Duncan alleged that County social workers and others retaliated against her after she questioned the role of a tribal social worker and opposed placing N.O. with Eve Robinson and Greg Hotz. She also challenged the investigation that substantiated allegations of emotional abuse against her, her placement on the California Abuse Central Index, N.O.’s removal from her home, and Defendant Baca’s pursuit of a contempt charge during juvenile dependency proceedings.

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state enough facts supporting a legally recognized claim. The court had previously dismissed Duncan’s first, second, and fourth causes of action without leave to amend. The defendants sought dismissal of the remaining causes of action except the third, although Baca separately argued that absolute prosecutorial immunity protected her from the third claim.

Rulings

Seventh, tenth, and eleventh causes of action. Duncan withdrew these causes of action. The court dismissed them.

Twelfth cause of action: declaratory and injunctive relief. Duncan sought an order requiring the County to adopt policies and provide training concerning child-welfare investigations and the Indian Child Welfare Act. She clarified that she sought declaratory relief, rather than injunctive relief, at that time. The court dismissed this cause of action because declaratory and injunctive relief are remedies, not independent causes of action, and because declaratory relief was duplicative of relief available through other claims.

Third cause of action: First Amendment retaliation against Baca. Duncan alleged that Baca retaliated against her by initiating a contempt proceeding based on Duncan’s alleged public sharing of confidential information about N.O.’s case. The court held that Baca’s request for a contempt order during an existing juvenile dependency proceeding was a quasi-prosecutorial function performed while acting as the County’s advocate. The court therefore held that absolute prosecutorial immunity protected Baca from liability for pursuing the contempt order.

The court also considered Duncan’s allegation that Baca fabricated evidence or falsely certified facts in an affidavit. It concluded that Duncan had not identified which facts Baca personally certified as true or explained why those facts were false. The court further found that the complaint did not satisfy the heightened pleading requirement for allegations of fraud or mistake. The third cause of action against Baca was dismissed. The order later stated that Duncan could file a third amended complaint if she could, consistently with Rule 11, plead facts supporting an exception to Baca’s immunity.

Fifth cause of action: municipal liability. Duncan alleged that the County had customs, policies, or practices of retaliating against Indian custodians, denying procedural protections, removing children without adequate safeguards, failing to follow Indian Child Welfare Act placement preferences, using fabricated evidence, and failing to train social workers. A municipal-liability claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires facts plausibly showing a constitutional violation caused by an official policy, custom, failure to act, or decision by a final policymaker.

The court dismissed this claim. It held that Duncan’s individual experience did not support a plausible inference that the County had a retaliatory custom or was deliberately indifferent to such conduct. It also held that the complaint did not adequately connect a California Department of Justice stipulated judgment concerning training and services to the alleged violations of Duncan’s rights. The fifth cause of action was dismissed without leave to amend because Duncan had already had multiple opportunities to identify an unconstitutional County policy or practice and further amendment would be futile.

Sixth cause of action: California civil-rights claims. Duncan alleged violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, and other California statutes. She conceded dismissal of her Unruh Act claim and defended only the Bane Act claim. The court dismissed the sixth cause of action against Beck, Winstead, Boyle, Bollman, and Nugent without leave to amend, and dismissed the allegations based on California Civil Code sections 43, 45, 46, 51, and 52 without leave to amend.

As to the Bane Act claim, the court dismissed the claims against Boyle, Bollman, and Nugent because the complaint improperly grouped allegations against them without specifying each person’s conduct. The court dismissed the claim against Miller because California immunity statutes protected her discretionary child-welfare conduct and conduct connected with judicial or administrative proceedings. The court also held that Duncan had not plausibly alleged an exception for malicious perjury, fabrication of evidence, withholding known exculpatory evidence, or obtaining testimony through duress. The court dismissed the claim against Baca for similar reasons, holding that the complaint did not plausibly allege conduct outside the applicable immunity. The conclusion stated that Duncan could amend the sixth cause of action against Miller and Baca if she could plead facts supporting an exception to their immunity.

Eighth cause of action: malicious prosecution concerning R.K. The court dismissed the claim against Miller because the complaint did not overcome the immunities that protected her and did not identify a qualifying full legal action initiated by Miller that ended in Duncan’s favor. The court dismissed the claim against Baca because she was immune from liability for initiating the abuse charges and because Duncan had not plausibly alleged that Baca lacked probable cause. The court reasoned that Baca could reasonably have believed the abuse allegations had merit based on R.K.’s disclosure and Miller’s report substantiating the allegations.

Ninth cause of action: malicious prosecution concerning the contempt charge. The court dismissed this claim against Baca. It held that Baca’s contempt request was a motion made during ongoing juvenile dependency proceedings, not the initiation of a separate full legal action. The court also noted that Duncan did not allege that the contempt charge ended in her favor. The court stated that amendment would be futile because the contempt request was a subsidiary procedural action.

Disposition

The order dismissed the seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth causes of action without leave to amend. It also dismissed the fifth cause of action without leave to amend, dismissed the sixth cause of action against Beck, Bollman, Boyle, Nugent, and Winstead without leave to amend, and dismissed the sixth cause of action based on the specified California Civil Code provisions without leave to amend. The order permitted Duncan to file a third amended complaint by July 12, 2024, if she could in good faith plead facts addressing the deficiencies in the third cause of action against Baca and the sixth cause of action against Miller and Baca. The provided opinion text ends before fully stating the disposition of the remaining third cause of action, although it indicates that the case would proceed on that claim except as to Defendant Baca if Duncan did not amend.