Rowen v. Prasifka

Background

Robert Jay Rowen sued William Prasifka, Reji Varghese, Jannsen Tan, Rob Bonta, John Stanley Gatschet, and Caitlin Ross over the suspension and eventual revocation of his medical license. Rowen represented himself. The amended complaint appeared to assert nine claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows claims against people acting under state authority for violating federal constitutional rights.

Rowen alleged that the California Medical Board first suspended his license and later conducted a sham hearing to support revocation. The court noted that the Medical Board’s decision stated that Rowen had been convicted of federal tax evasion, sentenced to 18 months in federal prison, and ordered to pay a $95,000 fine and $241,156.28 in restitution. His license was automatically suspended during his incarceration under California law. Rowen filed a notice of defense, and an evidentiary hearing was held on June 19, 2023. According to the noticed administrative decision, Rowen appeared briefly to object to the administrative hearing office’s authority, left before the hearing began, and did not present evidence. The administrative law judge later recommended revocation, and the Medical Board adopted that decision.

Judicial Notice and Motion Standard

The court took judicial notice of the existence of the Medical Board decision and the allegations contained in it, but not disputed facts in that document for their truth. The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted properly pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion but did not accept legal conclusions without supporting facts.

Official-Capacity Claims

Rowen sought monetary relief against the defendants in both their individual and official capacities. The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because there was no waiver of that immunity. Those claims against Prasifka, Varghese, Tan, Bonta, Gatschet, and Ross were dismissed without leave to amend.

Supervisory-Liability Claims

Rowen sued Bonta and Gatschet based on alleged supervisory roles. The court explained that a supervisor can be liable under § 1983 only if the supervisor personally participated in the constitutional violation, directed it, knew about it and failed to prevent it, or had a sufficient causal connection to it. The court found Rowen’s allegations speculative and conclusory and said they did not plausibly show that Bonta or Gatschet directed, participated in, or knew about the alleged misconduct. These claims were dismissed with leave to amend.

Claims Against Ross

The court found that the amended complaint alleged little about Ross beyond listing her as an attorney for the complainants and asserting generally that the defendants interfered with a fair hearing. Rowen did not respond to the defendants’ argument about Ross in his opposition, which the court treated as a concession. Claims against Ross in her individual capacity were dismissed without leave to amend.

Claims Challenging the License Process

Claims 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9 challenged the administrative process used to suspend and revoke Rowen’s license. Although the claims invoked the Eighth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments, the court treated the core allegations as procedural due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. A procedural due process claim requires a protected liberty or property interest, government deprivation of that interest, and a lack of adequate process.

The court held that the complaint did not allege a due process violation. Rowen did not dispute that he received notice, filed a notice of defense, and had an opportunity to participate in a hearing. The court stated that California’s administrative procedure provides a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that Rowen’s refusal to participate in the hearing did not amount to a Fourteenth Amendment violation.

The court also rejected the other constitutional theories. The Fourth Amendment claim failed because the complaint did not allege a seizure of property or meaningful interference with a possessory interest. The Fifth Amendment due process protection applies to the federal government, and the complaint did not allege federal involvement in the license proceedings. The criminal double-jeopardy protection did not apply because the Medical Board proceeding was not criminal. The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial did not apply because the Medical Board did not charge Rowen with a crime. The Seventh Amendment did not require a jury in this administrative proceeding involving enforcement of public rights. Finally, Rowen did not show that the Eighth Amendment applied to revocation of a medical license; the administrative costs assessed against him were described as $1,016.50 for investigation and prosecution.

The court dismissed claims 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Claims 1, 7, and 9 were dismissed with leave to amend. The portion of claim 2 based on the Fourteenth Amendment was dismissed with leave to amend. Claims 3, 6, and 8 were dismissed without leave to amend, as was the portion of claim 2 based on the Fifth Amendment. The court’s conclusion also stated that claims based on the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments were dismissed without leave to amend, while claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment were dismissed with leave to amend.

Claims 4 and 5

Claim 4 alleged that the defendants lacked standing to bring the administrative action. The court found that theory did not make sense in this federal lawsuit because the defendants had not brought an action against Rowen in federal court. Claim 4 was dismissed without leave to amend.

Claim 5 challenged California Business and Professions Code section 2236(a) as unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutional as applied. That provision treats a conviction for an offense substantially related to a physician’s qualifications, functions, or duties as unprofessional conduct. The court noted that a regulation defines “substantially related” and found that the amended complaint did not address the regulation or explain how it was vague. Claim 5 was dismissed with leave to amend.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It dismissed without leave to amend the official-capacity claims for monetary damages, the claims against Ross in her individual capacity, claim 4, and specified portions of claims 2, 3, 6, and 8. It dismissed with leave to amend the supervisory-liability claims against Bonta and Gatschet, claims 1, 5, 7, and 9, and the Fourteenth Amendment portion of claim 2. Because the court could not say amendment would be futile, it gave Rowen a final opportunity to file an amended complaint by July 29, 2024.