McNeff v. The City of Pleasanton

Background

Peter McNeff alleged that he was a police officer for the Pleasanton Police Department and had worked for the City of Pleasanton since December 2015. On January 6, 2021, he attended a “Stop the Steal” rally during his personal time and in civilian clothing. He posted photographs of himself and his wife at the rally on his personal Facebook page.

After one officer accused McNeff of being a member of the Proud Boys, the police department took no action and told McNeff that it would not act on that accusation. Another officer later searched McNeff’s social-media account and submitted an anonymous complaint about his posts. Chief David Swing then relieved McNeff of his duties and placed him on leave.

The police department later investigated McNeff’s social-media activity through an outside law firm. The investigation sustained two policy violations, and the City terminated McNeff’s employment. McNeff challenged the termination in arbitration and prevailed. The arbitrator found that the posts did not violate City policy, determined that McNeff had engaged in First Amendment-protected activity, and ordered reinstatement and payment of back pay with interest. The opinion states that McNeff had not yet returned to active duty.

McNeff’s Second Amended Complaint asserted two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: First Amendment retaliation claims against Chief Swing and Captain Larry Cox, and a claim against the City of Pleasanton based on municipal liability. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally sufficient claim. The court had previously dismissed an earlier complaint with leave to amend.

Claims Against the Individual Defendants

For a First Amendment retaliation claim, the court explained that a plaintiff must plausibly allege protected activity, an action that would discourage an ordinary person from continuing that activity, and a causal connection showing that the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor. The court also discussed the requirement that the protected activity be the “but-for” cause of the adverse action.

The court found that McNeff adequately alleged the first two elements: attending the rally was protected activity, and being placed on leave and terminated were adverse actions that could discourage political participation. The court concluded, however, that McNeff did not adequately allege the required causal connection. According to the court, McNeff’s allegations showed that the adverse actions followed a separate complaint about his social-media history, not the earlier complaint about his rally attendance. The City and police department also had an alternative stated basis for the actions: alleged violations of City and police-department policies found during an investigation by an independent law firm.

The court held that McNeff had not shown that the adverse actions would not have occurred without a retaliatory motive. It therefore concluded that he had not adequately alleged a constitutional violation and that Chief Swing and Captain Cox were entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from damages liability unless their conduct violated a federal right that was clearly established at the time.

The court also rejected McNeff’s proposed additional allegations concerning what Chief Swing knew about the complaints. It concluded that the proposed facts were already included in the Second Amended Complaint and would not cure the pleading problem. The court dismissed the first cause of action against both individual defendants without leave to amend.

Claim Against the City

The court considered whether McNeff plausibly alleged municipal liability under § 1983. Under the rule commonly called Monell liability, a city may be liable for a constitutional violation caused by an official policy or custom. A city may also be liable when an official with final policymaking authority delegates that authority or ratifies a subordinate’s decision.

The court determined that the Pleasanton City Manager, rather than Chief Swing or Captain Cox, had final policymaking authority over hiring and firing. McNeff alleged that the City Manager delegated that authority to Chief Swing and knew about and ratified the termination decision. The court found those allegations conclusory because McNeff supplied no supporting facts showing delegation or explaining how the City Manager knew that the termination was retaliatory or ratified it on an unlawful basis.

The court therefore dismissed the § 1983 claim against the City for failure to plausibly allege municipal liability. It denied leave to amend because McNeff proposed a theory that Chief Swing alone had final policymaking authority, which the court found inconsistent with his earlier pleadings that identified the City Manager as the final policymaker. The court dismissed the second cause of action against the City without leave to amend.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. It found that further amendment would be futile, dismissed both causes of action without leave to amend, and dismissed the case with prejudice.