Roe v. City and County of San Francisco
- Jon Tigar
- 4:24-cv-01562
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 12
In Roe v. City and County of San Francisco, Judge Tigar granted the City’s dismissal motion in part, denied it in part, and allowed amendment of dismissed claims.
The ruling affected Jane Roe, Susan Roe, Mary Roe, the other plaintiffs, and the City and County of San Francisco. The ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims continued, while the third through tenth causes of action were dismissed with leave to amend.
What happened
In Jane Roe, et al. v. City and County of San Francisco, residents and businesses alleged that unsafe and blocked sidewalks in the Tenderloin resulted from the City’s failure to enforce drug and anti-encampment laws.
The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their federal constitutional claims, but that Susan and Mary Roe adequately alleged disability-discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. It also rejected the City’s challenge to those claims at this stage.
Judge Tigar granted the City’s motion to dismiss the third through tenth causes of action, with leave to amend, and denied the motion as to the first and second causes of action. The plaintiffs had 21 days to amend; otherwise, the dismissed claims would be dismissed with prejudice.
The detailed version
- Roe v. City and County of San Francisco · No. 4:24-cv-01562
- Jon Tigar
- July 19, 2024
Background
The plaintiffs are residents and businesses in the Tenderloin neighborhood. They alleged that the City treated the neighborhood as a “containment zone” for narcotics activity by allowing people to buy and use narcotics openly, remain on sidewalks while under the influence of drugs, and engage in related conduct. They alleged that the resulting conditions made City-owned walkways and public spaces dangerous, unsanitary, and inaccessible.
The complaint asserted ten causes of action: claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; a claim under California’s Disabled Persons Act; public and private nuisance claims; federal due-process and equal-protection claims; a federal state-created-danger due-process claim; negligence; and a claim under Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution. The City moved to dismiss all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.
Standing for the Federal Constitutional Claims
The court held that the federal constitutional claims were based on the City’s alleged policy of not enforcing drug and anti-encampment laws in the Tenderloin. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were essentially asking it to order the City to change its enforcement policies and bring more enforcement actions against other people.
Because the plaintiffs were not themselves prosecuted or threatened with prosecution, the court held that they lacked standing to challenge the City’s alleged failure to enforce those laws. The court therefore dismissed the federal constitutional claims as part of the third through tenth causes of action.
Disability-Discrimination Claims
The court held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged standing for their claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Susan Roe alleged that she has a disability and uses a walker. Mary Roe alleged pulmonary and spinal conditions that make walking difficult. They alleged that encampments and bulky items, including duffle bags, shopping carts, and disassembled bicycles, obstructed Tenderloin sidewalks and made them inaccessible.
The court also held that these allegations were sufficient to state claims under both statutes. The alleged barriers identified how the sidewalks prevented the plaintiffs from using them, and the complaint alleged that the City receives federal financial assistance, which was sufficient at the motion-to-dismiss stage for the Rehabilitation Act claim. The court therefore denied the City’s motion to dismiss the first and second causes of action.
California Constitutional Claim
The court dismissed the claim under Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution with leave to amend. It held that this provision does not impose an affirmative duty on the government to guarantee citizens’ safety or happiness. Because the plaintiffs sought to require the City to enforce drug and anti-encampment laws, the court concluded that the claim did not state a viable theory under that provision.
State-Law Claims and Immunity
The City argued that California governmental-immunity provisions barred the negligence and other remaining state-law claims because they were based on the City’s failure to enforce laws. The plaintiffs argued that immunity did not apply because they sought only equitable relief rather than money damages.
The court rejected that argument at this stage. It concluded that the requested injunction would require the City to enforce its drug and anti-encampment laws more extensively, creating legal and financial burdens protected by the immunity provisions. The court dismissed the remaining state-law claims with leave to amend.
Other Requests and Disposition
The court denied both sides’ requests for judicial notice because the requests sought to expand or dispute the allegations considered on the motion to dismiss. It also denied the City’s request to stay discovery, without prejudice, because the request was premature.
The court granted the City’s motion to dismiss the third through tenth causes of action, with leave to amend, and denied the motion to dismiss claims one and two. The plaintiffs could file an amended complaint within 21 days, solely to correct the deficiencies identified in the order. If they did not file an amended complaint by that deadline, the claims dismissed in the order would be dismissed with prejudice.
Read the full 12-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.