Dutrisac v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.

Background

Elisabeth Sardin Dutrisac alleged that STMicroelectronics, Inc. and STMicroelectronics N.V. hired her as a design engineer. She alleged that her supervisor, Gilles Bouvier, repeatedly made sexual comments, asked her on dates, and sexually assaulted her twice. She further alleged that Bouvier retaliated by excluding her from meetings, restricting her access to files, withholding work, and criticizing her skills after she complained. According to the complaint, she reported the conduct to human resources and another manager, but Bouvier remained her supervisor and she was later terminated.

Dutrisac asserted 11 claims, including discrimination, hostile-work-environment harassment, retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination and harassment, several California Labor Code claims, wrongful termination, sexual battery, negligent supervision and retention, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The alleged events occurred between January 2000 and 2003. Dutrisac filed the action in California state court on December 21, 2023, and STMicroelectronics, Inc. removed it to federal court.

Requests for Judicial Notice

The court declined to use allegations from another court opinion as additional factual support for Dutrisac’s claims. It explained that judicial notice of another court’s opinion establishes the opinion’s existence, not the truth of disputed facts stated in it.

The court granted Dutrisac’s request to take judicial notice of certain webpages, two SEC filings, and the docket in this case. For the webpages and SEC filings, however, judicial notice was limited to the existence of those materials and not the truth of reasonably disputed factual assertions within them.

STMicroelectronics N.V.: Personal Jurisdiction

STNV argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. The court agreed that Dutrisac had not shown general or specific jurisdiction based on STNV’s own contacts. The opinion states that STNV is incorporated under Netherlands law and maintains its legal seat in Amsterdam, and that STNV presented evidence that it did not conduct business or own property in the United States and had never employed Dutrisac or the individuals she identified.

Dutrisac instead argued that STNV’s contacts could be attributed to ST Inc. under an alter-ego theory. That theory can allow a court to disregard the separate identities of related companies when there is such unity of ownership and interest that the companies no longer have separate personalities and refusing to disregard them would cause fraud or injustice.

The court found that Dutrisac’s allegations of alter-ego status were conclusory and lacked factual support. It also found that the evidence she cited—including use of the “STMicroelectronics” name, compensation with STNV stock, website references, and STNV’s SEC filings—did not show the level of control needed to treat STNV and ST Inc. as one entity. Because Dutrisac failed to satisfy the unity-of-interest part of the test, the court did not analyze the fraud-or-injustice part.

The court granted STNV’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Although it considered it highly unlikely that the defect could be cured, it allowed Dutrisac one opportunity to amend with additional facts supporting jurisdiction.

STNV: Service of Process

STNV also challenged the method and timing of service. Dutrisac had served an agent for CT Corporation System in California. The court found that this did not satisfy the applicable federal rules because it did not comply with the international service procedures applicable to service in the Netherlands, and because CT Corporation and ST Inc. were not authorized to accept service for STNV.

The court also found that Dutrisac had not shown that ST Inc. was STNV’s “general manager” under California law. A parent-subsidiary relationship alone was insufficient, and Dutrisac had not alleged facts or identified evidence showing the required connection between the companies.

The court therefore quashed service of process. It did not dismiss the claims based on inadequate or untimely service because it found a reasonable prospect that proper service could still be made. The court also found good cause to extend the time for service in the United States because STNV had actual notice, would not be prejudiced, and the delay arose in part from counsel’s mistaken understanding about representation. The 90-day limit would not apply if Dutrisac served STNV in the Netherlands under the applicable rule.

ST Inc. and Bouvier: Statute of Limitations

ST Inc. and Bouvier argued that all claims against them were time-barred. The court explained that, based on the dates alleged in the complaint, the ordinary limitations periods had expired.

Dutrisac relied on a California law that can revive certain otherwise time-barred claims for damages from sexual assault if the plaintiff files during the specified revival period and alleges, among other things, that an entity responsible for the damages engaged in a cover-up or attempted cover-up of a previous instance or allegation of sexual assault.

The court found that Dutrisac had not adequately alleged the required cover-up. Her allegations about the human-resources response and her termination occurred after the alleged assaults and therefore could not satisfy the court’s reading of the revival statute. Her assertion that ST Inc. had a longstanding culture of enabling sexual assaults and retaliating against complainants was unsupported by facts beyond her own allegations. The court also held that the statute’s reference to a “concerted effort” requires action by two or more people, and that Dutrisac had not alleged that Bouvier acted with anyone else. In addition, the alleged retaliation—excluding her, withholding work, and criticizing her coding—did not support a reasonable inference that Bouvier was trying to hide evidence or encourage her silence.

The court granted ST Inc.’s motion to dismiss the claims against ST Inc. and Bouvier for failure to allege the requirements of the revival statute. It granted leave to amend because Dutrisac might be able to allege additional facts showing a qualifying cover-up that occurred before the alleged assaults.

Other Procedural Rulings and Final Order

The court denied STNV’s request to join ST Inc.’s motion because the request was untimely.

The final order states that STMicroelectronics, Inc.’s motion to dismiss was granted and that Dutrisac’s claims against ST Inc. and Bouvier were dismissed with leave to amend. STNV’s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part: the claims against STNV were dismissed with leave to amend for lack of personal jurisdiction, service was quashed, and the request to dismiss for inadequate or untimely service was denied. Dutrisac could file an amended complaint within 30 days. The order did not decide whether the alleged discrimination, harassment, retaliation, assaults, or other underlying conduct occurred or whether defendants were ultimately liable.