Weinberg v. Twitter, Inc.

Background

The case is a putative class action, meaning the plaintiffs seek to represent a larger group that has not yet been certified as a class. The plaintiffs are Nhu Weinberg, Samantha Gongora, Julia Steele, Omolade Ogunsanya, Nanci Sills, Krista Bessinger, and Ikuhiro Ihara. The opinion identifies them as former employees of X Corp., which it describes as Twitter, Inc.’s successor in interest.

The plaintiffs challenge a reduction in force that followed Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter in late October 2022. They alleged that more than half of the workforce was laid off and that the selections were made quickly by a small group of managers under Musk’s supervision, with little attention to performance, qualifications, experience, or abilities.

Weinberg alleged that she took 10 weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to care for her child and was selected for layoff less than a month after returning. The plaintiffs also alleged that women and employees age 50 or older were laid off at higher rates than comparison groups. Ogunsanya alleged that Black employees were more likely to be laid off than white employees. The plaintiffs relied on statistical allegations and statements or conduct by Musk that they said showed discriminatory intent.

Motion-to-dismiss standard

Twitter, Inc. and X Corp. moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts and a legally recognized theory of relief. At this stage, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and viewed them in the plaintiffs’ favor, but it did not accept unsupported legal conclusions.

FMLA claims

The court held that Weinberg adequately pleaded an FMLA interference claim. She alleged that she took protected leave, suffered an adverse employment action when she was selected for layoff, and was laid off within a month of returning. The court held that this close timing, considered with allegations that employees on leave were laid off at a higher rate and that many remaining employees on leave later left after an ultimatum, plausibly supported a causal connection.

The court also declined to dismiss the proposed FMLA class allegations. It held that questions about the proposed class definition’s clarity and whether the class members were sufficiently similar were better addressed during discovery and class certification. The court denied Twitter’s motion to dismiss the FMLA class claims on standing grounds.

Disparate-treatment claims under Title VII and the ADEA

Disparate treatment means treating an individual less favorably because of a protected characteristic. The court held that Weinberg, Gongora, Steele, Sills, Bessinger, and Ihara sufficiently alleged disparate treatment based on sex or age. Their allegations included their protected characteristics, adequate job performance, their layoffs, statistical evidence, Musk’s comments about women and older workers, and the rushed layoff process. Taken together, the court found those allegations supported a plausible inference that discriminatory intent affected the layoffs.

The court reached a different conclusion about Ogunsanya’s race-discrimination disparate-treatment claim. It held that the allegation that Black employees were statistically more likely to be laid off was conclusory and lacked supporting facts, such as comparative statistical charts. That claim was therefore not sufficiently pleaded.

Disparate-impact claims under Title VII and the ADEA

Disparate impact concerns a facially neutral employment practice that disproportionately harms a protected group. The court held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged sex- and age-based disparate-impact claims. They identified the mass layoff and the rushed process, including the alleged lack of consideration of performance, qualifications, experience, and abilities, as the relevant employment practice. The statistical allegations were sufficient at the pleading stage to plausibly allege disparities and a causal connection.

The court rejected Twitter’s argument that the plaintiffs had to identify an employment practice beyond the reduction in force. It relied on Ninth Circuit authority recognizing that a reduction in force can qualify as a specific employment practice and held that the plaintiffs’ allegations went beyond the mere existence of the layoffs.

The court also rejected Twitter’s argument that an ADEA disparate-impact claim could not be based on a subgroup of employees age 50 or older. The court held that Bessinger and Ihara adequately stated their ADEA disparate-impact claim.

The court held that the racial disparate-impact claim failed for the same general reason as the racial disparate-treatment claim: the allegations of racial disparity were conclusory and factually unsupported.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss. The FMLA claims, sex-discrimination claims, and age-discrimination claims were sufficiently pleaded. The racial-discrimination claims under Title VII were dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiffs could file an amended complaint within 28 days of the order, and no new claims or parties could be added without the court’s permission or the defendant’s stipulation.

The opinion’s caption refers to a motion to dismiss and motion to strike, but the provided text expressly rules on the motion to dismiss and does not separately state a disposition for a motion to strike.