William H. v. Colvin

Background

Erik William H. sued to challenge the Social Security Administration’s decision denying his application for benefits. The district court initially denied his motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the administrative law judge’s decision and sent the matter back with instructions to award benefits.

The Social Security Administration later issued a notice stating that Erik William H. was owed $89,436 in past-due auxiliary benefits. His attorney, Josephine M. Gerrard, filed a second motion for attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The retainer agreement allowed counsel to seek up to 25% of past-due benefits. The Commissioner responded, and no objections were filed.

Legal standard

Section 406(b) permits an attorney who successfully represents a Social Security claimant in federal court to seek fees of no more than 25% of the past-due benefits awarded. The court must independently review the fee arrangement to determine whether it produces a reasonable result. Relevant considerations include the quality of the representation and the result achieved. The court may reduce the requested amount if the representation was inadequate, the attorney caused delay, or the fee would be an improper windfall. A lodestar calculation—the hours worked multiplied by an hourly rate—may assist the court but is not the required starting point or controlling measure under this statute.

Court’s analysis

Gerrard reported spending 178.40 hours litigating the case in federal court. The court had previously awarded $44,752.75 in fees, and the new request was $22,359. If granted, the total fee award would be $67,101.75, producing an effective hourly rate of $376.13 for the requested award.

The court found the request reasonable. It did not exceed the statutory 25% maximum, and the hours appeared reasonable. The court explained that fees under section 406(b) are evaluated primarily under the contingent-fee agreement and the results achieved, rather than by using the lodestar method as a baseline. It also noted that courts have approved higher effective hourly rates in other section 406(b) cases.

The court found no indication of substandard representation. Gerrard obtained a substantial past-due-benefits award, and no party objected to the request. The court therefore concluded that the fee was not excessively large compared with the benefits achieved.

Disposition

The court granted the second motion for attorneys’ fees. It awarded $22,359, less any administrative assessment required under 42 U.S.C. § 406(d). The fees are to be paid from Erik William H.’s past-due benefits in accordance with agency policy. The court also stated that counsel had already been ordered to refund $19,000 in previously approved Equal Access to Justice Act fees, so no further refund was required.