Reaud v. Facebook, Inc.

Background

Alfred Pedro Reaud brought claims against Facebook, Inc., which the court noted is now known as Meta, Inc. Reaud alleged that he saw 93 unwanted pornographic advertisements in his Facebook feed beginning in December 2021. He said he repeatedly reported the advertisements, but Facebook ignored his requests. He also alleged that Facebook blocked him from interacting with friends or Facebook pages after he posted screenshots of the advertisements.

Reaud asserted claims for sexual harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Facebook’s Terms of Service incorporated Facebook’s Community Standards and provided that claims concerning the Terms of Service or a user’s access to or use of Facebook would be governed by California law. The case was transferred from the District of Colorado to the Northern District of California under the forum-selection clause in those Terms of Service.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

The court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted factual allegations as true but did not accept unsupported legal conclusions. A complaint must contain enough factual content to make liability plausible.

Sexual-Harassment Claim

The court held that Reaud failed to state a sexual-harassment claim. Under California law, there is no common-law cause of action for sexual harassment. The closest comparable California statute, the Fair Employment and Housing Act, did not apply because Reaud did not interact with Facebook in connection with employment or housing.

Reaud argued that his claim arose under Colorado criminal law, but the court rejected that argument because the Terms of Service selected California law. He also referred in his opposition brief to California Civil Code section 1708.88, which provides a private claim in certain circumstances involving the electronic sending of unsolicited obscene images. The court held that Reaud could not add a new legal theory through an opposition brief. It also held that section 1708.88 did not apply because its exemption covers entities transmitting, routing, or providing connections for electronic communications initiated by or at the direction of another person, and Facebook fell within that exemption as an online application operator carrying third-party advertisements.

Intentional-Infliction-of-Emotional-Distress Claim

The court also dismissed Reaud’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. That claim requires extreme and outrageous conduct, severe or extreme emotional distress, causation, and intentional or reckless conduct.

Reaud alleged that Facebook caused emotional and psychological injury by showing him unwanted pornography and by blocking his interactions after he posted screenshots of the advertisements. The court found that these allegations did not sufficiently show that Facebook intended to cause him emotional distress or acted while realizing that injury would result. The court characterized Facebook’s alleged conduct, at most, as passive conduct involving third-party advertisements rather than conduct directed primarily at Reaud. The court stated that Reaud conceded he had not alleged sufficient facts showing the required intent.

Communications Decency Act Section 230

The court separately held that Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act barred Reaud’s claims. Section 230 generally protects an interactive computer service from being treated as the publisher or speaker of information supplied by another content provider.

The court found that the advertisements were supplied by third parties. Reaud’s complaint alleged that Facebook served the advertisements but did not allege that Facebook created or developed them. The court refused to consider new allegations in Reaud’s opposition brief that Facebook had co-created or modified the advertisements.

The court also found that Reaud’s claims treated Facebook as the publisher of the advertisements because they sought to hold Facebook liable for serving, allowing, posting, or withdrawing third-party content. To the extent the intentional-infliction claim was based on Facebook blocking Reaud from the platform, the court likewise viewed that theory as challenging Facebook’s decisions concerning online content. The court therefore concluded that Facebook was entitled to Section 230 immunity.

Disposition

The court found that the complaint failed to state either claim and that Section 230 independently barred the claims. It denied Reaud leave to amend because additional factual allegations could not overcome Section 230. Judge Araceli Martinez-Olguin granted Facebook’s motion to dismiss with prejudice.