Khankin v. CSL Behring, L.L.C.
- Susan Van Keulen
- 5:24-cv-04030
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 13
In Khankin v. CSL Behring, Judge Van Keulen partly granted and partly denied the company’s motion to dismiss, allowing amendment of most claims.
Eliyahu Khankin may continue pursuing his promissory-estoppel claim and may amend the dismissed claims and most punitive-damages requests. CSL Behring obtained dismissal of the second through twelfth causes of action with leave to amend and dismissal without leave to amend of the punitive-damages request tied to promissory estoppel.
What happened
In Khankin v. CSL Behring, Eliyahu Khankin, a physician and former remote employee of CSL Behring, alleged that the company wrongfully terminated him and committed other employment-related violations. His complaint asserted twelve claims, including disability discrimination, retaliation, contract claims, invasion of privacy, and defamation.
The court allowed Khankin’s promissory-estoppel claim to proceed but dismissed his second through twelfth claims because the complaint lacked enough specific facts. The court allowed him to amend those claims. It also dismissed his request for punitive damages, allowing amendment for most of those requests but not for punitive damages tied to the promissory-estoppel claim.
Judge Susan Van Keulen therefore granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. Khankin could file an amended complaint by October 8, 2024, except that he could not revive the punitive-damages request connected to promissory estoppel.
The detailed version
- Khankin v. CSL Behring, L.L.C. · No. 5:24-cv-04030
- Susan Van Keulen
- Sept. 17, 2024
Background
Eliyahu Khankin alleged that he began working remotely for CSL Behring, L.L.C. in July 2021 as Executive Director of Clinical Pharmacology and Translational Development for the Transplant Therapeutic Area. CSL Behring terminated his employment in October 2023. After filing a discrimination charge with the California Civil Rights Department and receiving a notice of the right to sue, Khankin filed this lawsuit in state court. CSL Behring removed the case to federal court.
The complaint asserted twelve causes of action: promissory estoppel; retaliation in violation of public policy; wrongful termination in violation of public policy; discrimination and harassment under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act; failure to prevent and investigate discrimination and harassment; failure to provide reasonable accommodation; intentional infliction of emotional distress; breach of contract; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; unfair business practices; invasion of the constitutional right to privacy; and defamation.
Legal standard
CSL Behring moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which applies when a complaint does not allege enough facts to support a legally recognized claim. At this stage, the court generally treats well-pleaded allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the plaintiff, but it does not accept conclusory allegations or unreasonable inferences. If amendment might cure the defects, the court generally allows the plaintiff to amend.
Rulings on the claims
The court denied the motion to dismiss the first cause of action for promissory estoppel. The court found that Khankin had properly pleaded that claim as an alternative to his breach-of-contract claim. However, the court dismissed his request for punitive damages connected to promissory estoppel without leave to amend because punitive damages are not recoverable on that claim under California law.
The court dismissed the second cause of action for retaliation in violation of public policy with leave to amend. Khankin did not adequately allege what protected activity he engaged in, when or how he disclosed his disability or raised concerns, or facts connecting that activity to his termination.
The court dismissed the fourth cause of action for discrimination and harassment under the Fair Employment and Housing Act with leave to amend. The complaint did not clearly identify the protected characteristic underlying the claim, did not provide specific facts supporting an inference that discrimination substantially motivated an employment decision, and did not describe conduct sufficiently specific or severe to support a harassment claim.
The court dismissed the third cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy with leave to amend. Khankin did not identify the constitutional or statutory public policy supporting the claim and relied on vague references to conduct described elsewhere in the complaint.
The court dismissed the fifth cause of action for failure to prevent and investigate discrimination and harassment with leave to amend because Khankin had not adequately stated an underlying discrimination or harassment claim. It dismissed the sixth cause of action for failure to provide reasonable accommodation with leave to amend because the complaint did not allege facts showing that Khankin informed CSL Behring of his hearing impairment and neurodivergence or requested an accommodation.
The court dismissed the seventh cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress with leave to amend. The complaint did not allege conduct extreme enough to support the claim or effects severe enough to meet the applicable standard.
The court dismissed the eighth cause of action for breach of contract with leave to amend. The complaint did not adequately explain how the alleged contract was formed, identify its relevant terms, or specify where those terms appeared in the alleged written, oral, or implied agreement. The court also dismissed the ninth cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with leave to amend because that claim depended on an adequately pleaded underlying contract claim.
The court dismissed the tenth cause of action for unfair business practices with leave to amend. The complaint did not adequately state the other legal violations on which the unfair-business-practices claim was based and did not clearly identify the allegedly fraudulent or deceptive conduct.
The court dismissed the eleventh cause of action for invasion of the constitutional right to privacy with leave to amend because the complaint did not sufficiently identify the acts forming the basis of the alleged privacy violation.
The court dismissed the twelfth cause of action for defamation with leave to amend. The court found one allegation involving a comment to a coworker sufficient at that stage, although the statement might later be found privileged. But the complaint did not allege that a statement was published to third party Uptal Patel.
Punitive damages and disposition
The court dismissed with leave to amend the punitive-damages requests connected to claims that were themselves dismissed. The complaint’s allegations that CSL Behring’s agents and managing agents knew of, approved, or ratified the alleged conduct were too broad and conclusory. The court dismissed without leave to amend the punitive-damages request connected to promissory estoppel.
Judge Susan Van Keulen ordered that CSL Behring’s motion to dismiss the second through twelfth causes of action was granted with leave to amend. The motion to dismiss Khankin’s punitive-damages claims was granted, with leave to amend except for the request connected to the first cause of action for promissory estoppel. Except as expressly granted, the motion to dismiss was denied. Khankin was permitted to file a First Amended Complaint by October 8, 2024.
Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.