Angel D. v. Kijakazi

Background

Angel D. sought judicial review of an administrative law judge’s decision denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. She amended her alleged disability onset date to June 2, 2017, and sought benefits for a closed period ending January 2, 2021.

The case had previously been remanded after the parties agreed that errors required further administrative proceedings. The administrative law judge held another hearing and again found Angel D. not disabled. In this second federal case, both sides agreed that another remand was necessary because the administrative law judge had improperly evaluated medical evidence and the resulting residual functional capacity. They disagreed about the remedy: Angel D. sought immediate calculation and payment of benefits, while the defendant sought remand for further proceedings.

Medical evidence and administrative decision

The record included psychological evaluations by Katherine Wiebe, Psy.D., Laura Jean Catlin, Psy.D., Maria Kerosky, Ph.D., and Sokley Khoi, Ph.D. The evaluations differed in the testing performed and in the severity of the limitations identified. Dr. Wiebe and Dr. Catlin described substantial or extreme mental and cognitive limitations affecting Angel D.’s ability to maintain attention, complete tasks, handle stress, attend work regularly, interact with others, and function in a workplace. Dr. Catlin also opined that Angel D. would be off task about 10 percent of the time. A vocational expert testified that a person who was off task 10 percent of the time would not be employable.

The administrative law judge found severe physical and mental impairments, including spinal conditions, major depressive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. The judge determined that Angel D. could perform a limited range of light work, could not perform her past work, but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The judge therefore found her not disabled during the requested period.

Court’s analysis

The court reviewed the denial under the substantial-evidence standard, which asks whether relevant evidence would be adequate for a reasonable person to support the agency’s conclusion, and for legal error. It held that the administrative law judge improperly rejected Dr. Wiebe’s opinions based on Angel D.’s childcare activities, lack of mental-health medication, reliance on self-reports, the characterization of the testing as cursory, and the fact that the evaluation had been obtained through Angel D.’s representative.

The court concluded that these reasons were not supported by substantial evidence. It found, among other things, that the administrative law judge did not identify a specific conflict between caring for children at home and working, improperly substituted a lay view for medical expertise concerning medication, and could not reject a psychological opinion merely because it relied partly on the patient’s reports. The court also found no evidentiary support for treating the referral by Angel D.’s representative as a reason to discount Dr. Wiebe’s evaluation.

The defendant had conceded that the rejection of Dr. Catlin’s opinions and the resulting residual functional capacity were unsupported by substantial evidence. The court therefore did not conduct a detailed point-by-point analysis of those opinions and credited both Dr. Wiebe’s and Dr. Catlin’s opinions as true.

Credit-as-true analysis

The court applied the credit-as-true doctrine, a rule that can require an immediate benefits award when improperly rejected evidence is accepted as true. The court found that all three required conditions were met: further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; the administrative law judge failed to give legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the evidence; and, if the evidence were credited as true, the administrative law judge would be required to find Angel D. disabled.

The court concluded that Angel D.’s mental impairments at least equaled the severity of the applicable listing criteria for depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. It also concluded that the combined effects of her depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder left her with no residual capacity to function in the workplace. Separately, the vocational expert’s testimony established that the 10-percent off-task limitation described by Dr. Catlin would make Angel D. unemployable. The court found no serious doubt in the overall record about whether Angel D. was disabled.

Disposition

The court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. It DENIED Defendant’s Cross-Motion seeking remand for further proceedings. The court REVERSED the administrative law judge’s finding of non-disability and REMANDED the case for the immediate calculation and award of appropriate benefits.