Jones v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation

Background

Amanda Jones moved for $75,594.67 in sanctions against the Santa Cruz Metropolitan Transit District (SCMTD) and/or its counsel. The court also ordered SCMTD and its counsel to explain why they should not be sanctioned. The dispute arose during the first day of a scheduled retrial. Before defense voir dire—the questioning of prospective jurors—Robert G. Howie, SCMTD’s counsel, told the jury pool that Jones had multiple sclerosis and was “confined to a wheelchair for reasons that have nothing to do with” the accident involved in the case.

The court had previously granted Jones’s motion for a mistrial. It found that causation was the central issue and that Howie’s statement directly addressed causation in a prejudicial way. The court also noted that neither side had planned to call new witnesses, that no witness at the earlier trial had mentioned multiple sclerosis as a cause of Jones’s injuries, and that Howie knew the witness he identified as supporting the statement would not be called.

Sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927

Section 1927 permits a court to require an attorney personally to pay excess costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees reasonably incurred when the attorney unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies the proceedings. The court found that Howie’s statements were a frivolous argument rather than a legitimate inquiry into potential juror bias. The court further found that his conduct was reckless, extremely prejudicial, and directly caused the need for a third trial, another jury-selection process, and duplicated trial preparation.

The court therefore sanctioned Howie personally under Section 1927. It did not impose sanctions on SCMTD under that statute because Section 1927 sanctions may be imposed on individual attorneys rather than their clients or law firms. The court also stated that it would not sanction SCMTD under its inherent power because Howie committed the misconduct and there was no basis to attribute it to SCMTD.

Court expenses

The order to show cause included expenses connected with empaneling the prospective jurors. The court concluded that it could not impose monetary sanctions under Section 1927 for those court-incurred expenses. It reasoned that the statute’s recoverable costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees refer to amounts incurred by the opposing litigant, not jury fees incurred by the government or court. The court declined to decide whether its inherent power could support an award of those expenses because the order to show cause invoked only Section 1927.

Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees

Jones requested reimbursement for fees charged by Carla D. Aikens, PLC, and Peiffer Wolf Carr Kane Conway & Wise LLP. The court approved Aikens’s requested hourly rate of $750. It reduced Catherine Cabalo’s requested hourly rate from $920 to $785 because the case had one remaining negligence claim and was less complex than matters supporting the higher rate. It approved an hourly rate of $550 for associate Khushpreet Mehton and $150 for legal assistant Katarzyna Pazik when Pazik performed substantive legal work.

The court applied a 50 percent reduction to otherwise compensable trial-preparation time billed before the mistrial because some preparation could be reused at the continued trial. It also excluded administrative tasks and certain travel time. The court awarded $40,664.25 in attorney’s fees, including $24,210 for the day of the mistrial and subsequent sanctions proceedings and $16,454.25 for trial preparation.

Plaintiff’s expenses

The court awarded $5,699.04 in expenses. It granted reimbursement for $150 in service-of-process expenses and 50 percent of the requested expert fees, or $971.41. It denied the requested $8,326.11 for printing and delivery because the trial exhibits could be reused or supplemented for the continued trial.

The court allowed certain meal expenses, reduced several meals to a $50-per-person limit, and awarded $4,140.79 for travel, lodging, and parking. That amount included the accessible train tickets for Jones, flights to and from San Francisco, other reasonable travel expenses, reduced lodging costs, and airport parking.

Disposition

The court granted Jones’s motion for sanctions in part and denied it in part. It sustained the order to show cause in part and overruled it in part. The court ordered Howie personally to pay $46,363.29—$40,664.25 in attorney’s fees and $5,699.04 in expenses—to Jones and her counsel.