Donald M. v. Kijakazi

Background

Attorney Harvey Sackett represented Donald M. in federal court after the denial of Donald M.'s application for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On March 3, 2023, the court granted Donald M.'s motion, denied the government's motion, and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings.

The court had previously approved $6,250 in attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. After the remand, an administrative law judge issued a fully favorable decision and awarded Donald M. retroactive benefits totaling $165,820.40. The Social Security Administration withheld $41,450.25, approximately 25 percent of the past-due benefits, in case counsel sought fees.

Sackett sought $29,000 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) for work performed in federal court. Counsel reported spending 29.35 hours on the court representation. The requested amount was approximately 17.5 percent of the past-due benefits. Counsel also appeared to be seeking $12,000 for work before the agency, but the court stated that the reasonableness of fees for agency-level work was for the agency to decide.

Donald M. did not dispute that his attorney should be paid, but argued that counsel's performance did not justify a full 25 percent of his past-due benefits. His letters focused largely on the quality of representation at the administrative level. The government took no position on the request but asked the court to independently assess whether the fee was reasonable.

Legal standard

Under the Social Security Act, a court may approve a reasonable fee for a claimant's attorney after the claimant prevails in court, subject to a limit of 25 percent of the past-due benefits. The court must independently review the requested fee, beginning with the lawful contingent-fee agreement and then considering whether the amount should be reduced.

Relevant reasons for reducing a fee can include substandard representation, delay, or a windfall to the attorney. Fees awarded under Section 406(b) must be offset by fees previously awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

Court's analysis

Judge Susan Illston found that Donald M. signed the fee agreement and that the agreement allowed a fee of up to 25 percent of past-due benefits after a successful federal appeal. The court found no indication of substandard performance. Instead, counsel had prevailed on a contested summary-judgment motion, achieving an excellent result.

The court also found that 29.35 hours was reasonable in proportion to the case's complexity and that the requested fee would not be a windfall. Although the resulting effective hourly rate was just under $1,000, the court found it consistent with other fee awards in similar cases and reflective of the risk involved in contingency-fee representation. The court further noted that the 25-percent limit in Section 406(b) applies to court representation and does not combine the fees allowed for court and agency representation into one 25-percent ceiling.

The court did not decide whether the requested agency-level fees were reasonable. It also found no undue delay attributable to misconduct from counsel's requests for one 30-day extension and one 14-day extension in the federal appeal.

Disposition

The court GRANTED the motion for attorney's fees and awarded $29,000 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The order directed that $6,250 be reimbursed for the earlier Equal Access to Justice Act award, producing a net payment of $22,750. The court stated that the government should make reasonable efforts to tender payment in a timely manner.