Clinkenbeard v. King
- John Tunheim
- 0:23-cv-03151
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 13
In Clinkenbeard v. King, Judge Tunheim held that a federal prisoner with an aggregated sentence including a firearm conviction cannot earn First Step Act time credits.
Robert Clinkenbeard and federal prisoners whose aggregated sentences include a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), as well as the Bureau of Prisons’ administration of First Step Act time credits.
What happened
Clinkenbeard, who is serving a 97-month federal sentence, challenged the Bureau of Prisons’ decision to deny him time credits under the First Step Act. His sentence included a conviction for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime.
Clinkenbeard argued that he had completed the 60-month part of his sentence tied to the firearm conviction and had entered a 37-month part tied to a conviction that would otherwise qualify for credits. The government argued that the Bureau of Prisons had to treat his consecutive and concurrent prison terms as one combined sentence.
Judge Tunheim agreed with the government, concluding that the firearm conviction made Clinkenbeard ineligible for First Step Act time credits for the balance of his combined sentence. The judge overruled Clinkenbeard’s objections, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied the habeas petition, and dismissed the action with prejudice.
The detailed version
- Clinkenbeard v. King · No. 0:23-cv-03151
- John Tunheim
- Sept. 30, 2024
Background
Robert Clinkenbeard, proceeding without a lawyer, is serving a 97-month federal sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution in Sandstone, Minnesota. He pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon and a person convicted of domestic violence, distribution of a controlled substance, and using a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The sentences for the first two offenses ran concurrently, and the 60-month sentence for the firearm offense ran consecutively. For administrative purposes, the Bureau of Prisons treated the terms as one aggregated 97-month sentence.
The First Step Act allows certain federal prisoners to earn time credits through qualifying recidivism-reduction programs or productive activities. Those credits may be applied toward prerelease custody or supervised release. The Act excludes prisoners serving sentences for specified offenses, including a conviction under § 924(c). The Bureau of Prisons repeatedly determined that Clinkenbeard was ineligible for credits because of his § 924(c) conviction.
Petition and Report and Recommendation
Clinkenbeard filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a procedure for challenging the execution or administration of a federal sentence. He argued that the Bureau of Prisons improperly barred him from earning time credits. He acknowledged that the firearm conviction made him ineligible but argued that he had completed the 60-month portion associated with that conviction and was serving the remaining 37-month portion associated with an otherwise eligible offense.
The government and Warden Mark King argued that a prisoner convicted of both eligible and ineligible offenses remains ineligible for credits for the full aggregated sentence. Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois recommended denying the petition and dismissing the action with prejudice. Clinkenbeard objected to that recommendation. Judge Tunheim reviewed the properly challenged portions of the recommendation from the beginning, as required for a de novo review.
Analysis
The court held that the First Step Act’s exclusion applies to Clinkenbeard for the balance of his aggregated sentence. The court relied first on 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), which requires multiple concurrent or consecutive prison terms to be treated for administrative purposes as one aggregate term. In the court’s view, that requirement means the Bureau of Prisons could not divide the aggregated sentence into separate eligible and ineligible periods when determining time-credit eligibility.
The court also considered the Bureau of Prisons’ interpretation of the First Step Act. It recognized that Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo had rejected mandatory deference to an agency merely because a statute is ambiguous. However, the court explained that an agency’s interpretation may still be persuasive, particularly when the agency has experience implementing the statute or Congress has delegated authority to fill in details of the statutory program. The court did not rely exclusively on the Bureau of Prisons’ interpretation but found that interpretation consistent with Congress’s intent.
The court further relied on the First Step Act’s legislative history, which it understood as focusing on excluding prisoners who committed specified crimes rather than allowing prisoners to divide their sentences into eligible and ineligible segments. The court also cited decisions from other courts, including an Eighth Circuit decision, as persuasive support for treating an aggregated sentence containing an ineligible conviction as wholly ineligible for time credits.
Disposition
Judge Tunheim agreed with the magistrate judge that Clinkenbeard was ineligible to earn First Step Act time credits for the balance of his aggregated sentence. The court overruled Clinkenbeard’s objection, adopted the Report and Recommendation, denied the writ of habeas corpus, and dismissed the action with prejudice. The court ordered that judgment be entered accordingly.
Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.