Republic of Turkey v. Christie's Inc.
- Alison Nathan
- 1:17-cv-03086
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 25
In Republic of Turkey v. Christie’s, Judge Nathan denied defendants’ summary judgment, granted Turkey’s counterclaim judgment, reserved the expert ruling, and denied sealing requests.
The Republic of Turkey, Christie’s Inc., Michael Steinhardt, and the disputed Anatolian Marble Female Idol of Kiliya Type. Turkey’s claims continued because defendants’ summary-judgment motion was denied, while Turkey prevailed on summary judgment against Christie’s and Steinhardt’s counterclaims.
What happened
Republic of Turkey v. Christie’s Inc. concerns Turkey’s claim that it owns an ancient marble idol under a 1906 Ottoman law. Turkey sued Christie’s and Michael Steinhardt for allegedly wrongful possession and sought the idol’s return and a declaration of ownership; they asserted claims based on interference with the planned sale.
The court ruled that Turkey’s claims were filed on time and that the 1906 law is an ownership law. But factual disputes remained about where and when the idol was excavated and exported, so the court did not grant defendants’ request for summary judgment. The court also concluded that Turkey was entitled to summary judgment on the defendants’ interference counterclaims.
Judge Alison J. Nathan denied Christie’s and Steinhardt’s summary-judgment motion, granted Turkey’s summary-judgment motion, reserved judgment on Turkey’s challenge to expert testimony, and denied the sealing requests without prejudice. The court also denied the parties’ requests for oral argument.
The detailed version
- Republic of Turkey v. Christie's Inc. · No. 1:17-cv-03086
- Alison Nathan
- Dec. 2, 2019
Background
The Republic of Turkey sued Christie’s Inc., Michael Steinhardt, and the Anatolian Marble Female Idol of Kiliya Type, identified as a defendant-in-rem. Turkey alleged that the ancient artifact had been unlawfully excavated and smuggled out of Turkey and claimed ownership under a 1906 Ottoman Decree. Turkey brought New York-law claims for conversion, which concerns wrongful control over another’s property, and replevin, which seeks return of specific property, along with a request for a declaration that Turkey owned the idol.
Christie’s and Steinhardt asserted counterclaims for tortious interference with contract and, alternatively, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. They sought a declaration that Steinhardt owned the idol. Steinhardt had consigned the idol to Christie’s for auction. It sold for a high bid of $12,700,000, but the buyer never took possession, and the idol remained with Christie’s.
The parties agreed that New York law governed their claims and defenses, while Turkish law governed the prior question of whether Turkey had a property interest in the idol. The court considered two summary-judgment motions, Turkey’s motion concerning expert testimony under the rule commonly called Daubert, and requests to file motion papers and exhibits with redactions or under seal.
Defendants’ Summary-Judgment Motion
The court denied Christie’s and Steinhardt’s motion for summary judgment on Turkey’s claims.
First, the court held that Turkey’s claims were timely. Under New York’s demand-and-refusal rule, a good-faith possessor’s conversion and replevin claims generally accrue when the owner demands return and the possessor refuses. The court found no evidence that Steinhardt was a bad-faith possessor, and the parties conceded that he was not. The claims therefore accrued on April 19, 2017, when Turkey demanded the idol and Christie’s and Steinhardt refused.
The court rejected the argument that Steinhardt’s earlier loans of the idol to the Metropolitan Museum of Art eliminated the need for a demand. The court explained that openly dealing with property as one’s own would have that effect only if the possessor knew beforehand that the property did not belong to him. The parties conceded that Steinhardt did not have that knowledge. The court also held that any unreasonable delay by a known owner was relevant only to a possible defense of laches, not to when the statute of limitations began running.
Second, the court held that the 1906 Ottoman Decree is an ownership law. The Decree states that movable and immovable antiquities located on public or private land were the property of the Ottoman government. The court concluded that, by its plain language, the Decree vested ownership of antiquities found in Turkey in the government and, after the Ottoman Empire, in modern-day Turkey. Evidence of the Decree’s enforcement and Turkey’s efforts to recover antiquities supported that interpretation. The court rejected arguments that the Decree was ineffective because it had not been adequately translated or publicized.
The court nevertheless found genuine disputes of material fact about whether this particular idol was found within modern-day Turkey and whether it was excavated and exported while the Decree was in effect. The idol was a Kiliya-type artifact, and Kulaksizlar in modern-day Turkey was the only known workshop for producing such idols, but the court recognized that similar objects had traveled around the eastern Mediterranean. The record also contained evidence from which a fact finder could infer that the idol had been excavated and exported from Turkey before American collectors acquired it in or around 1961. Because the court could not weigh evidence or decide witness credibility at summary judgment, it denied defendants’ motion.
Turkey’s Summary-Judgment Motion
The court granted Turkey’s motion for summary judgment on Christie’s and Steinhardt’s counterclaims.
For the tortious-interference-with-contract claim, the court assumed that a contract between Christie’s and the high bidder was formed when the bidder placed the highest bid. Even so, the court found that Christie’s and Steinhardt did not provide specific evidence that Turkey intentionally caused the high bidder to breach the contract without justification. Their allegations concerned Turkey’s efforts to identify the bidder and its discovery requests to third parties. The court found those actions were connected to pursuing this litigation and that the effort to identify the bidder had previously been approved by the court as potentially relevant.
For the tortious-interference-with-prospective-economic-advantage claim, the court held that Christie’s and Steinhardt did not allege that Turkey’s conduct was a crime or an independent tort. Turkey’s stated interest in recovering the idol also defeated the argument that it acted solely to harm them. The court further held that the defendants presented no evidence that Turkey used wrongful means. It therefore granted Turkey summary judgment on this counterclaim as well.
Other Rulings and Disposition
The court reserved judgment on Turkey’s Daubert motion challenging expert testimony. Because a trial without a jury was anticipated, the court stated that it could receive the evidence and later decide whether it was reliable and admissible. The court denied the parties’ sealing requests without prejudice, allowing them to submit narrower proposed redactions within ten business days with specific legal and factual support. The court also denied the parties’ requests for oral argument.
The opinion’s supplied filing date is December 2, 2019. The date printed in the opinion text appears corrupted, so the date in the metadata header follows the supplied case information.
Read the full 25-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.