Shapnik v. The Hebrew Home for the Aged at Riverdale
- Lewis Liman
- 1:20-cv-06774
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 34
In Shapnik v. Hebrew Home, Judge Liman remanded the case because the PREP Act did not create federal jurisdiction and denied summary judgment as moot.
The plaintiffs and the Estate of Rosa Shapnik may continue pursuing their New York-law claims in New York state court; the defendants’ federal summary-judgment motion was denied as moot, and the case was remanded.
What happened
Shapnik v. The Hebrew Home for the Aged at Riverdale began as a New York state-law case alleging that a nursing home and its employees provided negligent care to Rosa Shapnik, who later died. The defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act applied.
The defendants asked for summary judgment, which would have ended the case without a trial. The court also examined on its own whether the case belonged in federal court. The defendants argued that the PREP Act completely displaced the plaintiffs’ state-law claims and therefore allowed removal.
Judge Lewis J. Liman ruled that the court lacked authority to hear the case because the complaint asserted only New York claims and the PREP Act did not completely replace those claims with federal ones. The court remanded the case to state court and denied the defendants’ summary-judgment motion as moot.
The detailed version
- Shapnik v. The Hebrew Home for the Aged at Riverdale · No. 1:20-cv-06774
- Lewis Liman
- Apr. 26, 2021
Background
Bella Shapnik, acting for the Estate of Rosa Shapnik and individually, and Yakov Shapnik sued The Hebrew Home for the Aged at Riverdale and individual employees. The complaint alleged medical malpractice, violations of New York Public Health Law § 2803-c, negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention, negligence, and wrongful death under New York law. The allegations included untreated injuries, inadequate hygiene, pneumonia, COVID-19, and Rosa Shapnik’s death.
The case was filed in New York Supreme Court and later removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court separately questioned whether federal subject-matter jurisdiction existed, meaning whether the federal court had legal authority to hear the case.
The PREP Act and Removal
The defendants argued that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, or PREP Act, completely preempted the plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Complete preemption is a narrow doctrine under which a federal statute so completely replaces a state-law claim that the claim is treated as federal and may be removed to federal court.
The PREP Act generally provides immunity from federal and state liability for covered persons for losses related to the administration or use of covered medical countermeasures. It also creates a federal cause of action for death or serious physical injury proximately caused by willful misconduct, and requires that such an action be filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The defendants also relied on the federal COVID-19 declarations and guidance issued by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Jurisdictional Analysis
The court explained that federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the claims appearing on the face of the complaint. A federal defense, including ordinary preemption, generally does not permit removal. The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims were ordinary New York medical-malpractice, negligence, and wrongful-death claims. They did not assert a PREP Act claim or claims based on willful misconduct, and their claims did not require proof of willful misconduct.
The court held that the PREP Act is primarily an immunity statute. It does not create a federal cause of action for all claims involving covered persons, does not provide exclusive federal jurisdiction over those claims, and does not require federal substantive law to govern them. The Act’s limited preemption provision was not enough to establish complete preemption. The court also concluded that the Secretary of Health and Human Services could not expand or restrict federal-court jurisdiction through declarations or advisory opinions.
The court rejected the argument that the case presented a substantial federal question under the rule allowing some state-law claims involving important federal issues to be heard in federal court. Whether the defendants were immune under the PREP Act was a defense, not an element of the plaintiffs’ state-law claims. The court therefore concluded that the case had not been properly removed.
Disposition
Because federal subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking, the court did not decide whether the defendants were entitled to PREP Act immunity or whether the plaintiffs could prove their medical-malpractice, negligence, or wrongful-death claims. The court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as moot and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Bronx County. It directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motions and deadlines, close the federal case, and transfer the case back to state court.
Read the full 34-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.