Wiggins v. Unilever United States, Inc.

Background

Craig Wiggins, Rebecca Torres, and Charita Harrell brought a proposed class action against Unilever United States, Inc., doing business as Dove. They alleged that Dove products labeled “hypoallergenic” and “tear-free” contained ingredients that could cause allergic reactions, eye irritation, or eye damage. Their claims included alleged violations of New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350, similar claims under California and Pennsylvania law, breach of warranty, and unjust enrichment.

Unilever moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing; Rule 12(b)(2), arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Torres’s and Harrell’s claims; and Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to state legally sufficient claims.

Standing

The court held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged economic injury for purposes of seeking monetary relief. Their allegations that they paid a premium for products represented as “hypoallergenic” and “tear-free,” and that they would not have purchased the products had they known the alleged truth, were sufficient at the pleading stage.

The court reached a different conclusion regarding injunctive relief. Because the plaintiffs alleged that they had learned that the products contained the ingredients they challenged, any future purchases would not involve the same alleged deception. Their statement that they might purchase the products if Unilever reformulated them was too hypothetical to establish a real and immediate threat of future injury. The court therefore dismissed the claim for injunctive relief for lack of standing.

Personal Jurisdiction Over Torres’s and Harrell’s Claims

The court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Torres’s and Harrell’s claims under California and Pennsylvania law. The complaint alleged that Torres purchased Dove products in California and that Harrell purchased them in Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs did not argue that those claims arose from Unilever’s conduct in New York.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that it could use a related-jurisdiction theory based on Wiggins’s New York claims. It stated that the plaintiffs had not identified authority supporting that theory for claims by out-of-state plaintiffs based on purchases outside New York. The court dismissed Torres’s and Harrell’s claims, including their unjust-enrichment and breach-of-warranty claims, for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Wiggins’s New York Consumer-Protection Claims

The court held that the plaintiffs’ proposed meanings of “hypoallergenic” and “tear-free” were not unreasonable as a matter of law at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The court understood the proposed definitions to allow that the products could contain some potentially irritating or allergenic ingredients, but not in amounts known to cause allergic reactions or eye harm in a significant number of people.

The court nevertheless dismissed Wiggins’s claims under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350. The complaint identified ingredients classified as skin sensitizers, allergens, or eye irritants, but generally did not allege facts showing that the ingredients’ concentrations actually caused allergic reactions, eye irritation, or eye damage in significant numbers of people. The complaint gave a concentration for one ingredient in one product, but the court found that allegation still did not establish that the product formulation caused the alleged harm. The court also noted that the plaintiffs did not allege that they or their family members had experienced the claimed effects, and did not provide testing or expert information supporting the conclusions.

Breach of Express Warranty

The court treated Wiggins’s breach-of-express-warranty claim as arising under New York law. New York law generally requires a buyer to notify the seller of a warranty breach within a reasonable time after discovering or reasonably having discovered it.

Wiggins argued that filing the amended complaint constituted notice. The court did not resolve whether a complaint can ever provide adequate notice because the complaint did not state when Wiggins last purchased the products or when he discovered the alleged defect. Without those facts, the court could not determine whether any notice was timely. Unilever’s motion to dismiss the breach-of-warranty claim was therefore granted.

Unjust Enrichment

The court held that Wiggins’s unjust-enrichment claim was duplicative. It relied on the same alleged labeling conduct as his other claims and sought the same damages. The court rejected the argument that a potentially longer limitations period or pleading in the alternative could preserve the claim. Unilever’s motion to dismiss the unjust-enrichment claim was granted.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

The plaintiffs had previously amended their complaint but requested another opportunity to amend if the court found their allegations insufficient. The court granted leave to seek permission to amend because it could not conclude that amendment would necessarily be futile. Any motion for leave to amend was required to be filed by August 8, 2023, with a proposed Second Amended Complaint.

The court’s conclusion states that Unilever’s motion to dismiss was granted as to all of the plaintiffs’ claims and their request for injunctive relief. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motion.