Carroll v. Trump

Background

A jury in this case awarded E. Jean Carroll $17.3 million in compensatory damages and $65 million in punitive damages against Donald J. Trump for two defamatory statements he issued from the White House on June 21 and 22, 2019. The opinion later describes the compensatory award as $18.3 million, consisting of $11 million for reputational harm and $7.3 million for other harm.

Trump moved for a new trial or, alternatively, for judgment as a matter of law. A new trial would require the case to be tried again; judgment as a matter of law would overturn the jury’s verdict because the evidence was legally insufficient.

New-trial arguments

Trump argued that the court made errors in excluding evidence and instructing the jury about common-law malice. He also argued that the $7.3 million and $11 million compensatory awards and the $65 million punitive award were excessive.

The court rejected the argument that punitive damages required proof that Trump was motivated solely by a desire to injure Carroll. It distinguished “actual malice,” which concerns whether a speaker knew a statement was false or recklessly disregarded its truth, from “common-law malice,” which concerns a deliberate intent to injure or conduct motivated by hatred, ill will, spite, or reckless disregard of another’s rights. The court held that New York law requires common-law malice for punitive damages but does not require it to be the defendant’s only motive. The court also concluded that a contrary discussion in a New York appellate decision was not controlling because it was unnecessary to that decision and incorrectly transferred a rule concerning qualified privileges into the punitive-damages context.

The court further held that New York law requires punitive damages in a defamation case to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by clear and convincing evidence. It relied on a New York Court of Appeals decision and Second Circuit decisions treating that as the governing standard. The court found no error in its jury instruction.

The court rejected Trump’s claim that the compensatory awards were excessive. It said the evidence permitted the jury to find that his attacks reached more than 100 million people, included threats and personal attacks, endangered Carroll’s health and safety, and harmed her career, reputation, and emotional well-being. The court compared the awards with damages upheld in other New York defamation cases and concluded that the awards were not excessive under New York law.

The court also upheld the punitive award against Trump’s constitutional challenge. Applying three constitutional guideposts—the reprehensibility of the conduct, the relationship between the harm and the punitive award, and comparable penalties—the court concluded that the award passed constitutional review. The court emphasized evidence that Trump used the presidency to broadcast attacks against Carroll to millions of followers, continued making attacks over nearly five years, and made additional disparaging statements as the trial approached and during the trial.

Judgment as a matter of law

Trump argued that the jury could not reasonably find that his June 21 and 22, 2019 statements caused Carroll’s harm. He contended that some or all of the harm could instead have resulted from Carroll’s allegations against him, which had appeared in an article in The Cut before his statements.

The court rejected this argument. It stated that the jury and/or the court had found that Trump’s statements were false, defamatory, and made with actual and common-law malice. The statements had been viewed between 85 million and 104 million times, while the opinion found no evidence about the article’s dissemination. The court also said that Carroll testified about the statements’ impact and that causation was for the jury to decide when competing evidence and possible inferences existed.

Disposition

Judge Kaplan denied Trump’s motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law. The opinion states that the motions were denied, without adding a separate prejudice designation.