Greene v. Warner Music Group Corp
- Katherine Failla
- 1:23-cv-01555
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 33
In Greene v. Warner Music Group Corp., Judge Failla granted defendants’ motion and dismissed James A. Greene’s copyright and Lanham Act claims with prejudice.
James A. Greene’s copyright and Lanham Act claims against Warner Music Group, Megan Pete, Anthony White, and 1501 Certified Entertainment were dismissed with prejudice; the case was closed.
What happened
In Greene v. Warner Music Group Corp., James A. Greene claimed that Megan Pete, Anthony White, Warner Music Group, and 1501 Certified Entertainment copied his instrumental song, “It’s About To Be On,” in creating “Savage.” He also asserted claims under the Lanham Act, a federal trademark statute.
The defendants asked the court to dismiss the amended complaint because Greene had not plausibly shown that they accessed his work or that the two songs were sufficiently similar. Greene relied on alleged similarities involving rhythm, instruments, sirens, piano sequences, and drum patterns, and on a theory that his work reached White through another music professional.
Judge Failla granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed all of Greene’s claims with prejudice. She ruled that Greene’s access theory was speculative, the songs were not substantially or strikingly similar, and the Lanham Act claims were barred by Supreme Court precedent. The court also closed the case and denied fee-free appeal status.
The detailed version
- Greene v. Warner Music Group Corp · No. 1:23-cv-01555
- Katherine Failla
- June 18, 2024
Background
James A. Greene, a musician and hip-hop producer, alleged that he owned a registered copyright in the instrumental composition “It’s About To Be On,” created around October 7, 1999. He claimed that Megan Pete, professionally known as Megan Thee Stallion, Anthony White, professionally known as J White Did It, Warner Music Group, and 1501 Certified Entertainment infringed that copyright by creating and releasing “Savage.” Greene also brought claims under the Lanham Act for false designation of origin and reverse passing off.
Greene did not allege direct evidence that defendants copied his work. Instead, he relied on circumstantial evidence: he said that copies of his work had reached music-industry personnel in the early 2000s and that White could have obtained the work through Klenord “Shaft” Raphael, whom Greene described as White’s mentor or manager. Greene also alleged similarities between the works involving a 4/4 time signature, repeating two-bar sequences, instrumentation, siren sounds, a “trick play” involving replacement of instruments, and drum patterns.
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a plausible legal claim. The court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion and considered the two sound recordings because they were incorporated into the copyright allegations and could be reviewed when assessing similarity.
To plead copyright infringement, Greene had to allege ownership of a valid copyright and unauthorized copying. Unauthorized copying requires allegations supporting both actual copying and unlawful appropriation. Where there is no direct evidence, access and similarity may provide circumstantial evidence of copying. Access requires facts showing a reasonable possibility—not merely a bare possibility—that the alleged infringer encountered the earlier work. If access is not plausibly shown, the plaintiff may proceed only by showing that the works are so strikingly similar that independent creation is not reasonably possible.
Copyright Claims
The court held that Greene had not plausibly alleged access. Greene alleged that Raphael received CDs containing his work in 2000 and 2004, but he did not allege facts showing that Raphael actually listened to that particular work. The court found it unclear even whether the work was played during the 2004 encounter. Greene also did not allege concrete facts showing that Raphael later gave the work to White or that White otherwise encountered it.
The court also rejected a widespread-dissemination theory of access. Greene alleged that he distributed the work to people in the music industry and posted it on social-media platforms, but he did not allege that the work was commercially released, commercially successful, readily available on the market, or actually viewed online. The court concluded that these allegations established no more than a speculative or bare possibility of access.
The court independently held that the works were not substantially similar. It ruled that the shared 4/4 time signature and basic rhythmic sequence were common, unprotectable musical elements. The choice of similar instruments also was not, by itself, copyright-protected. After listening to the works, the court found that the alleged siren sounds were materially different: the sound in Greene’s work was an atonal synthesizer chord, while the sound in “Savage” was a distorted vocal sample. The court likewise found meaningful differences between the piano and synthesizer patterns.
The court rejected Greene’s allegations about the drum patterns because the actual patterns were different, including differences in the sounds used and the works’ tempos. It also declined to treat the patterns as similar merely because Greene synchronized the recordings to create a comparison. Finally, the alleged “trick play”—replacing instruments with different sounds—did not establish similarity because Greene’s theory itself acknowledged that the instruments had been changed.
Because the court found no substantial similarity, it also held that Greene could not meet the higher standard for striking similarity. The court described “It’s About To Be On” as an instrumental work and “Savage” as a pop song with lyrics and a different tempo, and concluded that any similarities involved common, non-copyrightable elements. The copyright infringement claim was therefore dismissed.
Other Claims
The court dismissed Greene’s claims seeking royalty payments and damages because those were remedies available only if he had established copyright infringement. It also rejected his claim seeking a declaration of copyright ownership or exclusive rights. Greene’s ownership of his own work was not disputed, and any claimed interest in “Savage” failed for the same reasons as the infringement claim.
The court dismissed Greene’s false-designation-of-origin and reverse-passing-off claims under the Lanham Act. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the court explained that the Lanham Act’s reference to the “origin” of goods concerns the producer of the tangible goods, not the author of an idea, concept, or creative work embodied in those goods.
Disposition
Judge Katherine Polk Failla granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint and dismissed all of Greene’s claims with prejudice. The court directed the clerk to terminate pending motions, adjourn remaining dates, and close the case. It also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) and denied Greene fee-free appeal status.
Read the full 33-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.