Breuninger v. T. Edward Williams

Background

This opinion concerns six supplemental counterclaims brought by T. Edward Williams and Jane Doe Williams against Richard Breuninger, ITGA, LLC, and third-party defendants Mick Levin, Mick Levin, PLC, John Robertson II, Jane Doe (or John Doe) Levin, Jane Doe (or John Doe) Robertson, and Jane Doe Breuninger. The underlying case is a legal-malpractice action. The counterclaimants alleged that the counterclaim defendants brought that action despite knowing that the malpractice claim lacked merit, in part because they believed a law firm would pay to settle a claim involving a young Black attorney.

The counterclaimants also alleged that Williams performed legal work related to ITGA and Club West and was owed $137,500.45 in legal fees. Their six claims were: defamation per se; abuse of process; violations of Section 487 of the New York Judiciary Law; unjust enrichment and quantum meruit; civil conspiracy; and negligence.

Personal Jurisdiction

The counterclaim defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court denied that motion as to Breuninger and ITGA because they were plaintiffs who had brought the action and therefore could not object to the court’s personal jurisdiction over them for purposes of related counterclaims.

The court declined to decide the personal-jurisdiction challenge as to Levin, Mick Levin, PLC, and Robertson because it dismissed all claims against those parties for failure to state a claim. The opinion does not separately resolve the personal-jurisdiction issue as to the other listed Doe parties.

Failure to State a Claim

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether the pleading contains enough factual allegations to state a legally plausible claim. Applying that standard, the court dismissed five of the six counts.

Count One: Defamation Per Se. The counterclaimants relied on statements in the third amended complaint as the alleged defamatory statements. The court held that the statements were absolutely privileged because they were made in a judicial proceeding and were pertinent to the litigation. The court therefore dismissed Count One with prejudice. The opinion also noted that New York does not recognize a separate false-light cause of action.

Count Two: Abuse of Process. The court held that filing and prosecuting lawsuits, even allegedly frivolous or malicious ones, was not enough by itself to support an abuse-of-process claim under New York law. The counterclaimants did not identify any separate court-issued process that required Williams to perform or refrain from a specific act and interfered with his person or property. The court dismissed Count Two with prejudice.

Count Three: New York Judiciary Law Section 487. The counterclaimants alleged that Levin and Robertson deceived parties or the court by pursuing claims they knew lacked merit. The court held that the allegations did not plausibly show the egregious deceit or extreme pattern of deceit required for a Section 487 claim. Alleged weaknesses in the evidence, differences between damages theories, and alleged inconsistencies in pleadings did not establish knowingly false statements. The court dismissed Count Three with prejudice.

Count Four: Unjust Enrichment and Quantum Meruit. This claim alleged that Breuninger and ITGA benefited from Williams’s legal services without paying him. The court treated unjust enrichment and quantum meruit as related quasi-contract claims. It rejected the arguments that the claim could be heard only in Arizona and that it was barred by a three-year limitations period. The court stated that New York law provides a six-year limitations period for both claims and concluded that Count Four was timely. The court declined to dismiss Count Four.

Count Five: Civil Conspiracy. The counterclaimants alleged that the parties conspired to violate New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct. The court held that those professional rules do not create a private right of action and that the counterclaimants had not alleged an underlying tort supporting civil conspiracy. The court dismissed Count Five with prejudice.

Count Six: Negligence. The counterclaimants alleged that Levin, Mick Levin, PLC, and Robertson negligently brought the malpractice action. The court held that, under New York law, an attorney generally does not owe a duty of care to an adversary. The counterclaimants did not allege a contractual or near-contractual relationship that could create an exception. The court dismissed Count Six with prejudice.

Other Rulings and Disposition

Williams filed a motion to strike the dismissal motion based on a local filing-rule violation. The court denied that motion because the violation did not appear to result from bad faith.

The court declined to grant leave to amend because it could not identify a request for another amendment. It dismissed Counts One, Two, Three, Five, and Six with prejudice, while Count Four remained pending. The court directed the clerk to close the docket entry for the dismissal motion. The court also directed the parties, within 14 days, to identify, dismiss, or seek permission to proceed under pseudonyms for the John and Jane Doe parties.