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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled June 20, 2024

Udoh v. New York City Department of Probation

Judge
Edgardo Ramos
Docket
1:24-cv-03982
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
5
Civil ProcedureEmploymentPro Se
In one sentence

In Udoh v. New York City Department of Probation, Judge Ramos dismissed claims against the agency and ordered service on four defendants.

Who this affects

Charles B. Udoh; the New York City Department of Probation, which was removed as a defendant; and the City of New York, Natasha Segers, Maryann Brown, and Lisa D’Ambrosia, who were designated for service.

What happened

Charles B. Udoh, who is representing himself, sued over alleged workplace discrimination based on age, race, nationality, religion, and disability. He brought claims under several federal, state, and city laws, along with emotional-distress claims.

Judge Ramos ruled that the New York City Department of Probation cannot be sued as a separate city agency, so the court dismissed Udoh’s claims against it and treated those allegations as claims against the City of New York. The court directed the U.S. Marshals Service to serve the City, Natasha Segers, Maryann Brown, and Lisa D’Ambrosia.

In Udoh v. New York City Department of Probation, Judge Ramos also extended the service deadline to 90 days after summonses are issued and denied permission to proceed without paying fees for any appeal from this order.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Udoh v. New York City Department of Probation · No. 1:24-cv-03982
Judge
Edgardo Ramos
Date
June 20, 2024

Background

Charles B. Udoh, proceeding without a lawyer, alleged that his employer discriminated against him based on age, race, nationality, religion, and disability. He asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and New York City and New York State human-rights laws. He also asserted state-law claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The court had previously allowed Udoh to proceed without prepaying filing fees. This order addressed whether the New York City Department of Probation could remain a defendant and how the remaining defendants would be served. It did not decide whether Udoh’s discrimination or emotional-distress allegations were legally or factually correct.

Claims Against the Department of Probation

The court dismissed Udoh’s claims against the New York City Department of Probation because, under New York City Charter chapter 17, § 396, a New York City agency generally is not an entity that can be sued separately. Because Udoh was representing himself, the court construed his allegations against the Department of Probation as claims against the City of New York, which was already named as a defendant.

The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the Department of Probation as a defendant and amend the case to remove it.

Service of Process

Because Udoh was allowed to proceed without prepaying fees, he could rely on the court and the U.S. Marshals Service to serve process. The court directed the Clerk to issue summonses and prepare the required U.S. Marshals Service forms for the City of New York, Natasha Segers, Maryann Brown, and Lisa D’Ambrosia, and to provide the necessary papers to the Marshals Service.

The court extended the time for service until 90 days after the summonses are issued. If service is not completed within that period, the order states that Udoh should request an extension. The order also required Udoh to notify the court in writing if his address changes and stated that the action could be dismissed if he failed to do so.

Disposition

Judge Edgardo Ramos dismissed Udoh’s claims against the New York City Department of Probation. The court directed service on the City of New York, Natasha Segers, Maryann Brown, and Lisa D’Ambrosia. The court also certified that an appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without prepaying fees for purposes of an appeal.

The authoritative version

Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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