White v. Distrokid

Background

Brian K. White, a professional musician, alleged that he created and copyrighted a set of beats. He alleged that he and musician Eunice Rivers entered an oral agreement allowing Rivers to use the beats in recorded and live music if she continued booking live performances for White and paid him 50% of proceeds from exploiting the beats or music containing them. The agreement allegedly provided that Rivers’ license rights would automatically return to White if she failed to meet those obligations.

Rivers created an album titled “Here I Am” using some of White’s beats. White alleged that Rivers did not continue booking performances for him or pay him the required share of proceeds. White said that he told Rivers on December 7, 2021, that she no longer had permission to use the beats and removed the album from DistroKid. He further alleged that Rivers later uploaded the album to DistroKid, which changed the format of at least one copy and distributed the album to digital music services.

White asserted direct and indirect copyright-infringement claims against DistroKid. DistroKid moved to dismiss those claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to support a legally valid claim. DistroKid also argued that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act protected it from liability.

Direct Copyright Infringement

The court rejected DistroKid’s argument that White and Rivers were automatically co-owners of a “joint work.” A joint work requires contributions by multiple authors who intended their contributions to form one work and intended to be co-authors. The alleged oral agreement restricting Rivers’ use of White’s beats, the absence of an attribution to White on the album, and the lack of allegations that White had decision-making authority over the album supported White’s position at the pleading stage. The court stated, however, that the allegations did not definitively resolve whether the album was a joint work; that issue could depend on evidence developed later.

The court also rejected DistroKid’s argument that White’s license to Rivers barred a copyright claim. White alleged that Rivers’ payment and performance obligations were conditions of the license and that the license rights returned to him when she failed to perform those obligations. White also alleged that he withdrew Rivers’ authorization before her later upload to DistroKid. Accepting those allegations as true for this motion, the court concluded that Rivers did not have the right to use the beats when she uploaded the album.

The court declined to consider DistroKid’s argument that it lacked the required voluntary conduct for direct infringement because DistroKid first raised that argument in its reply brief. The court stated that DistroKid could raise the argument in an appropriate motion. It denied DistroKid’s motion to dismiss White’s direct copyright-infringement claim.

Indirect Copyright Infringement

The court addressed two forms of indirect infringement: vicarious and contributory copyright infringement.

For vicarious infringement, White had to plausibly allege that DistroKid could supervise or control the infringing activity and received a direct financial benefit from it. The court found that White adequately alleged DistroKid could remove content from digital stores. But the court found no adequate allegation connecting DistroKid’s annual or monthly user fees to the alleged infringement. The complaint did not allege that users were attracted to DistroKid because it enabled infringement, or that the fees changed based on whether users uploaded infringing material. The court therefore granted DistroKid’s motion to dismiss the vicarious-infringement claim.

For contributory infringement, White had to allege that DistroKid knew or had reason to know about the infringement and materially helped it. The court found that the complaint alleged only that DistroKid tracked royalty payments or received reports about the music’s commercial exploitation. It did not allege facts showing that DistroKid knew, or had reason to know, that Rivers’ content infringed White’s copyright, or that DistroKid acted together with Rivers. The court therefore granted DistroKid’s motion to dismiss the contributory-infringement claim.

Digital Millennium Copyright Act Defense

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act can provide an affirmative defense to certain copyright claims for service providers that store user-provided material, if specified conditions are met. Because it is an affirmative defense, it can support dismissal at the pleading stage only when the defense is apparent from the complaint itself. A plaintiff generally does not have to plead facts disproving every possible affirmative defense.

The court concluded that the complaint did not establish the elements of DistroKid’s defense on its face. In particular, the complaint did not address DistroKid’s knowledge of the alleged infringement or whether it promptly removed the content after learning of the infringement. The court therefore held that the DMCA argument did not provide a basis for dismissal at this stage.

Disposition

The court granted DistroKid’s motion to dismiss as to White’s indirect copyright-infringement claims and denied the motion as to White’s direct copyright-infringement claim.