Ricky Hill v. AMB Sports & Entertainment, LLC
- John Koeltl
- 1:23-cv-02911
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 21
Hill v. Major League Soccer, Judge Koeltl granted MLS’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice.
Ricky Hill’s Title VII and Section 1981 race-discrimination claims against Major League Soccer LLC were dismissed with prejudice; the court directed entry of judgment and closed the case.
What happened
In Ricky Hill v. Major League Soccer LLC, Ricky Hill alleged that Major League Soccer discriminated against him because he is Black when soccer clubs did not hire him for coaching and technical positions. He brought claims under Title VII and Section 1981.
The court concluded that Hill applied to the clubs, not to MLS, and did not allege enough facts showing that MLS controlled or participated in the clubs’ hiring decisions. The court also found that he did not plausibly identify a policy causing a discriminatory effect, and that claims based on events more than 300 days before his filings with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission were too late.
Judge John G. Koeltl granted MLS’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, directed entry of judgment dismissing the case, and closed the case.
The detailed version
- Ricky Hill v. AMB Sports & Entertainment, LLC · No. 1:23-cv-02911
- John Koeltl
- July 10, 2024
Background
Ricky Hill alleged that Major League Soccer LLC (MLS) discriminated against him based on race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Hill alleged that, between late 2014 and mid-2021, he applied for coaching and technical positions with six professional soccer clubs affiliated with MLS. He alleged that three clubs—Atlanta United FC, Inter Miami CF, and Charlotte FC—hired white or other non-Black candidates whom he considered less qualified.
Hill’s original case named the clubs, the United Soccer Leagues, LLC, and MLS as defendants. A judge in the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the claims against the clubs and the USL and transferred the claims against MLS to the Southern District of New York because Illinois was not the proper venue. After a conference, the court allowed Hill to file an amended complaint. MLS then moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to support a legally plausible claim.
Title VII claims
The court held that Hill did not plausibly allege a Title VII failure-to-hire claim against MLS. An essential part of such a claim is that the plaintiff applied to, and was rejected by, the defendant employer. Hill alleged that he applied to the clubs and that the clubs did not hire him; he did not allege that he applied for a position with MLS.
Hill argued that MLS and the clubs were a single employer. Under the single-employer doctrine, legally separate entities may be treated as one employer if they function as one integrated enterprise. Courts examine the relationship between the entities, including their operations, labor-relations control, management, and ownership or financial control, with particular attention to which entity made the final employment decisions.
The court found that Hill alleged no specific facts showing that MLS officials participated in the clubs’ decisions not to hire him. The court found insufficient Hill’s general allegations that MLS owned the clubs, controlled league business and employment contracts, reviewed employment contracts, operated diversity initiatives, recognized racial disparities, and announced hiring policies. The court also noted that the MLS Constitution, as described in the complaint, stated that team operators—not MLS—hire and employ coaches. The court therefore concluded that Hill had not plausibly alleged that MLS and the clubs were a single employer for purposes of his Title VII claim.
The court separately rejected Hill’s Title VII disparate-impact theory. A disparate-impact claim challenges a facially neutral policy or practice that allegedly causes a racial disparity. The court held that Hill did not identify a specific MLS policy or practice that affected the decisions not to hire him, show the required connection between a policy and a disparity, or explain how MLS’s diversity initiatives, public statements, or delegation of compliance responsibilities adversely affected him. The court granted MLS’s motion to dismiss the disparate-impact claim.
Section 1981 claim
Section 1981 protects the right to make and enforce contracts without racial discrimination, including employment contracts. The court explained that Section 1981 employment-discrimination claims use the same substantive standard as Title VII claims. Because Hill had not plausibly alleged that MLS failed to hire him or took another adverse employment action against him, the court dismissed his Section 1981 claim.
Timeliness
MLS also argued that Hill’s claims were barred by the applicable time limits. For Title VII claims, a discrimination charge generally must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. The court rejected applying the continuing-violation exception because Hill’s allegations concerned separate hiring decisions. The court held that claims based on hiring decisions occurring more than 300 days before Hill’s October and November 2021 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filings were time-barred.
Disposition
Judge John G. Koeltl granted MLS’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, directed the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing the case, and closed the case.
Read the full 21-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.