Kuperman v. New York City Department of Education

Background

Moshe Kuperman sued the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) and Ronald James over his probationary employment as a physical education teacher at P.S. 202 from 2015 through 2019. He asserted racial and religious discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

In an earlier order, the court had dismissed several claims, including Title VII claims based on discrete events before January 8, 2019; state and city human-rights claims against the NYCDOE; § 1981 claims against the NYCDOE and James in his official capacity; and retaliation claims. The court also explained that Title VII claims cannot be brought against individual defendants and that the § 1981 claims identified in the footnote could not proceed against the defendants in the stated capacities. The motion addressed in this order concerned the remaining Title VII race and religion claims against the NYCDOE and the state and city human-rights claims against James.

Kuperman received mixed performance ratings during his first two school years. After James became principal in July 2017, Kuperman continued to receive mixed ratings, including several ineffective ratings. His Measures of Teacher Practice score never rose above Developing during his four-year probationary period. In June 2019, James recommended that Kuperman’s probationary period not be extended, citing ineffective teaching, and Kuperman’s employment was discontinued. Kuperman was the only teacher discontinued at the end of the 2018–2019 school year.

Title VII claims

The court applied the burden-shifting framework used for employment-discrimination claims. First, a plaintiff must make an initial showing suggesting discrimination. If that showing is made, the employer must identify a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. The plaintiff then must present enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the stated reason was not the real reason and that race or religion was at least a motivating factor.

For the race claim, the court held that Kuperman met the minimal initial burden because he was replaced by an African-American teacher, someone outside his protected category. For the religion claim, the court likewise found that James’s alleged question about whether Kuperman was Jewish, asked a few months before the employment decision during a meeting about tenure, was enough at the initial stage to support an inference of causation. The court did not resolve at that stage whether James actually asked the question.

The defendants provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discontinuing Kuperman: they contended that he was an ineffective teacher, supported by observation reports, performance ratings, and concerns about classroom management and student safety. The court found this explanation sufficient to shift the burden back to Kuperman.

At the final stage, the court held that Kuperman had not presented enough evidence of pretext, meaning evidence that the stated reason was a cover for discrimination. The record showed mixed evaluations both before and during James’s tenure, and Kuperman’s performance-practice score had never exceeded Developing. Assistant Principal Marsha Murat also rated him ineffective in every category during at least one observation. The court found that Kuperman’s disagreement with his evaluations, the fact that later evaluations were more negative, and his unsupported belief that administrators coordinated against him did not create a genuine factual dispute.

The court also rejected Kuperman’s proposed comparisons to three non-Jewish, African-American probationary teachers because he offered no admissible evidence that they received more support or were similarly situated in all important respects. His testimony about their treatment was based on unidentified sources and speculation. The court found that James’s story about experiencing racism as a child, Kuperman’s evidence concerning student remarks, and the alleged failure to respond adequately to student misconduct did not provide sufficient evidence that the discontinuance was motivated by race. The court separately concluded that the three student incidents over approximately five months were not sufficiently severe or frequent to establish a hostile-work-environment claim, to the extent Kuperman was attempting to assert one.

The religion claim also failed at the final stage. Kuperman was never denied time off for a religious observance. The court found that the evidence about James’s alleged reluctance to approve holiday requests was based on hearsay, and the available records showed that the requests were approved within roughly two to four business days. The court also found nothing improper about James asking whether a requested date was a recognized holiday. Even assuming James asked whether Kuperman was Jewish, the court concluded that Kuperman’s evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find religious discrimination.

State and city claims

After granting summary judgment on the remaining federal claims, the court considered whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims against James. Supplemental jurisdiction allows a federal court to hear related state-law claims, but the court may decline to do so when the federal claims have been dismissed and state-law issues would predominate.

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. It explained that all claims supporting federal-question jurisdiction were being dismissed, the state and city claims would then dominate the case, Kuperman had not made clear which of the many possible claims he intended to pursue under those laws, and the parties had provided little analysis of the different standards under the state and city laws. The court dismissed those claims without prejudice to litigation in a forum with jurisdiction over them.

Disposition

Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted the defendants’ Rule 56 motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The court dismissed Kuperman’s federal-law claims, declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state and city claims, dismissed those claims without prejudice, directed entry of judgment, and closed the case.