Gu v. The City of New York

Background

Feifei Gu, appearing without a lawyer, sued the City of New York; Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg; former District Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr.; Assistant District Attorney Javon Henry; supervisor Lisa Franchini; and Victim Aid Services Unit employee Maria Bolona. Gu alleged that Daby Keita assaulted her in April 2020. She asserted that Henry failed to prosecute the case diligently, causing the charges against Keita to be dismissed, and then failed to refile them. She also alleged that Franchini and the district attorneys failed to respond appropriately or investigate the matter. Gu further alleged that Bragg adopted a prosecution-priority policy that affected the case or the decision not to refile charges.

Gu brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for due process and equal protection violations, along with state-law claims for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of New York laws. She sought $48 million in damages and asked that the defendants be suspended from practicing law. The court had allowed her to proceed without prepaying filing fees, so it screened the complaint under the federal statute governing such cases.

Federal Claims

Due process. The court dismissed Gu’s due process claim because a complainant does not have a protected legal interest in the prosecution of another person. Prosecutors have discretion over whether to bring or continue criminal charges, and the court concluded that Gu therefore could not claim that the failure to prosecute Keita violated her constitutional rights.

Equal protection. The court dismissed Gu’s equal protection claim. Gu did not allege discrimination based on membership in a protected class. Nor did she identify similarly situated people who were treated differently or allege facts showing that any different treatment was intentional and improper. Her allegation that other cases involving more serious charges were also dismissed did not establish either a selective-enforcement claim or a “class-of-one” claim, which concerns intentional unequal treatment of one person without a rational basis.

Henry and Franchini. The court dismissed Gu’s damages claims against Henry based on prosecutorial immunity and, for claims against him in his official capacity, protection under the Eleventh Amendment. The court held that handling the prosecution, missing deadlines, deciding whether to refile charges, and other related charging decisions were prosecutorial functions.

The court also found that Gu did not state a constitutional claim against Franchini in her individual capacity because she had no constitutional right to Keita’s prosecution. Gu’s official-capacity failure-to-supervise claim also failed because the alleged misconduct did not involve a violation of Gu’s constitutional rights. To the extent Gu alleged that Franchini refused to refile charges, the court held that prosecutorial immunity also applied to that conduct.

Bolona. The court dismissed the § 1983 claims against Bolona because allegations that she did not work collaboratively or respond appropriately to Gu’s emails did not establish a violation of a constitutional right.

Vance, Bragg, and the City. The court dismissed Gu’s claims that Vance and Bragg failed to investigate Henry’s handling of the case. The court explained that the Constitution generally does not require the government to protect an individual from harm or investigate the individual’s complaints, and it found that neither recognized exception applied here.

The court also dismissed Gu’s § 1983 claim against Bragg and the City based on the alleged prosecution-priority policy without prejudice for lack of standing. The court noted that the dismissal of Keita’s case occurred in March 2021, before Bragg allegedly adopted the policy in January 2022, so Gu had not alleged a causal connection between the policy and the dismissal. The court also held that Gu, as a complaining witness who was not prosecuted or threatened with prosecution, lacked standing to challenge the alleged failure to refile charges against Keita.

State-Law Claims and Amendment

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—in the early stage of the case. The order stated that nothing prevented Gu from filing the state-law claims in state court or pursuing a civil action for damages against Keita.

The court declined to give Gu permission to amend because it found that the defects in her complaint could not be cured through amendment.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint under the screening statute and for lack of standing. It directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment. The court also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Gu’s fee-free status for purposes of an appeal.