Spiegel v. Estee Lauder Inc.

Background

After Estée Lauder Beauty LLC terminated Theresa Spiegel’s employment on November 14, 2022, Spiegel sued Estée Lauder Inc., Estée Lauder Companies, Inc., ELC Beauty LLC, Estée Lauder International Inc., and four individual defendants. The opinion identifies Spiegel as a store manager and describes allegations involving her supervision of Noé Arteaga, workplace rules, discipline, complaints about her conduct, administrative leave, and termination.

Spiegel alleged that she was treated less favorably because of her race, age, and gender orientation. She also asserted a race-discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a retaliation claim under that statute, New York tort claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and overtime claims under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. Spiegel had amended her complaint twice. She also sought to add allegations that some corporate defendants operated as a single employer. Separately, the defendants moved to strike allegations concerning Estée Lauder’s actions in 2020 relating to the Black Lives Matter movement and other initiatives.

Discrimination Claims

The court dismissed Spiegel’s hostile-work-environment claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. Under the city law’s broad standard, Spiegel had to allege that the employer treated her less well than other employees, at least partly because of a discriminatory motive. The court held that she did not plausibly allege that her treatment was caused by her race, age, or gender.

The court reasoned that the complaint instead described discipline and counseling connected to Spiegel’s own conduct, including alleged discriminatory treatment of a subordinate. It also held that Arteaga was not a suitable comparator because Spiegel supervised Arteaga, the complaint did not show that their conduct was comparable, and the alleged misconduct was materially different. Spiegel also did not allege that Jacobs was outside a protected group or otherwise an appropriate comparator.

The court further held that Arteaga’s complaints about Spiegel and the book titled “How to Be an Antiracist” did not support an inference that Arteaga acted against Spiegel because of Spiegel’s race, age, or gender. The court stated that an accusation of being racist is not itself evidence that the person making the accusation was discriminating against the accused because of race.

The court declined to strike the allegations about Estée Lauder’s 2020 policies and initiatives. It found that those allegations had, at most, faint relevance to Spiegel’s claims, but concluded that they did not need to be removed under Rule 12(f), which permits a court to strike redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous material.

The court also dismissed Spiegel’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. That statute prohibits racial discrimination in the enjoyment of contractual rights, including employment. The court held that Spiegel had not alleged facts supporting a plausible inference that the defendants intentionally discriminated against her because of race. The court also noted that § 1981 does not cover discrimination based on age, gender, or sexual orientation.

Retaliation Claim

The court dismissed Spiegel’s § 1981 retaliation claim. A § 1981 retaliation claim requires protected activity concerning discrimination based on race or alienage. Spiegel identified a statement by her attorney notifying Beauty that she was prepared to sue because of “illegal harassment,” a “hostile work environment,” and “illegal discrimination,” but the Second Amended Complaint did not provide the statement’s precise language or identify a complaint about race discrimination.

The court emphasized that the defendants had previously identified this pleading problem and that Spiegel had amended her complaint twice without supplying the needed facts. The court therefore held that the complaint did not plausibly allege protected activity covered by § 1981.

Tort Claims

The court dismissed Spiegel’s negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against Jacobs, Arteaga, Miller, and Eugene, as well as her negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim against Beauty. The court held that New York’s Workers’ Compensation Law generally provides the exclusive remedy for negligence claims against a person in the same employment. The opinion also notes that Spiegel did not oppose dismissal of the emotional-distress claim and did not address the workers’ compensation argument concerning the hiring, retention, and supervision claim.

Wage Claims

The court dismissed Spiegel’s overtime claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law. To state those claims, she had to provide enough detail to support a reasonable inference that she worked more than 40 hours in a particular workweek without proper overtime pay.

The complaint alleged that Spiegel worked 40 hours per week and regularly arrived before her scheduled start time, but it did not state how often she arrived early, how much additional time she worked, or what work she performed outside scheduled hours. The court held that the later allegations that she worked approximately 1,000 hours of overtime and was owed $65,000 were conclusory and did not cure the lack of detail.

Claims Against Two Corporate Defendants

The court granted the motion to dismiss all claims against Estée Lauder Inc. and Estée Lauder International Inc. The Second Amended Complaint did not attribute conduct to either company, allege facts establishing that either was Spiegel’s employer, or name either company in a cause of action. Although Spiegel’s opposition brief asserted additional facts concerning a single-employer theory for Estée Lauder Inc., the court would not consider facts that were absent from the complaint.

The court also noted that Spiegel had received two opportunities to amend, including another opportunity during briefing on the motion.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ March 15, 2024 motion to dismiss. It directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment for the defendants and close the case. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.