Clark v. CooperFriedman Electric Supply Co., Inc.

Background

John R. Clark worked for CooperFriedman Electric Supply Co., Inc., doing business as Cooper Power Systems and Cooper Electric Supply Co. The opinion states that Clark worked as a generator maintenance technician from approximately December 18, 2018, through September 30, 2022. He alleged that his work was manual labor, that he generally worked about forty to fifty hours each week, and that Cooper paid him every other week.

Clark sued individually and on behalf of proposed class members. Count One alleged that Cooper violated Section 191(1)(a) of the New York Labor Law by paying manual workers every two weeks rather than weekly. Counts Two and Three alleged, respectively, breach of contract and unjust enrichment and quantum meruit based on Cooper’s alleged failure to pay local prevailing wages required by public-works contracts.

Cooper moved to dismiss Count One for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Cooper also moved to dismiss Counts Two and Three under Rule 12(b)(6). Clark separately moved to strike Cooper’s reply or, alternatively, to file a further response.

Weekly-Pay Claim: Standing

The court denied Cooper’s motion insofar as it sought dismissal of Count One for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Standing is the requirement that a plaintiff show a concrete injury, a connection between that injury and the defendant’s conduct, and a likelihood that court-ordered relief would address the injury.

The court held that Clark plausibly alleged a concrete economic injury. Although Clark alleged that he eventually received the wages owed for each pay period, he claimed that half of each biweekly paycheck was paid one week later than allowed by Section 191(1)(a). The court concluded that this temporary deprivation of money was enough to establish standing. The court did not decide Clark’s proposed measure of damages based on the lost time value of that money.

Weekly-Pay Claim: Whether the Claim May Proceed

The court reserved ruling on Cooper’s Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to Count One. The issue is whether Section 198 of the New York Labor Law provides an express or implied private right of action for a violation of Section 191(1)(a)’s weekly-pay requirement.

The opinion describes conflicting decisions from New York’s Appellate Division. One decision held that Section 198 permits a worker to seek damages for a Section 191 pay-frequency violation, while another held that it does not. The court reserved ruling because the New York Court of Appeals might review the issue and its interpretation of New York law would bind this federal court. The court stated that it intended to request supplemental briefing depending on developments in that matter.

Contract and Quasi-Contract Claims

The court denied Cooper’s motion to dismiss Count Two. Clark alleged that Cooper entered into public-works contracts requiring payment of local prevailing wages, that he worked on public projects, and that he was paid below those rates. The court held that these allegations were sufficient at the pleading stage to state a breach-of-contract claim, including because relevant contract details might be primarily within Cooper’s knowledge.

The court also denied Cooper’s motion to dismiss Count Three. Under New York law, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit may be treated together as a single quasi-contract claim. The court concluded that if Cooper was required to pay prevailing wages and failed to do so, it was reasonable at this stage to infer that Cooper benefited from the alleged underpayment. Clark could pursue the quasi-contract claim in the alternative to his contract claim.

Other Motions and Disposition

Because the court planned to seek supplemental briefing and did not need to rely on arguments introduced in Cooper’s reply, it denied as moot Clark’s motion to strike the reply and his alternative request to file a further response.

The court denied Cooper’s motion insofar as it sought dismissal of Count One for lack of jurisdiction and dismissal of Counts Two and Three for failure to state a claim. The court reserved ruling on Cooper’s motion insofar as it sought dismissal of Count One for failure to state a claim. The court also directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motions pending at Docket Numbers 20 and 28 and stated that it would separately schedule an initial pretrial conference.