Goolden v. Wardak

Background

Sarah Goolden brought the action against Hamed Wardak, alleging sexual assault and rape. Wardak filed a counterclaim against Goolden for defamation per se, a type of defamation that is treated as especially serious under applicable law. He alleged that Goolden knowingly made false and malicious accusations that he had assaulted and raped her, and that she spoke with the New York Post so the allegations would be published widely.

Goolden moved to dismiss Wardak’s counterclaim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a pleading does not state a legally sufficient claim. She argued that the challenged statements were absolutely privileged because they repeated allegations made in a legal proceeding.

Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true, draws reasonable inferences for the party asserting the claim, and asks whether the allegations plausibly support legal relief. The court does not weigh evidence or decide disputed factual questions at this stage.

Under New York law, statements made during a judicial or similar proceeding generally receive absolute privilege when they are relevant to the proceeding, regardless of the speaker’s motive. The court explained that New York recognizes a narrow exception when statements are made maliciously and solely to defame the person targeted.

Court’s Analysis

The court concluded that Wardak had plausibly alleged facts bringing his counterclaim within that exception. His allegations included that Goolden’s accusations were fabricated and intended solely to destroy his reputation and career; that her father had threatened that she would accuse Wardak of sexual assault and rape if he continued seeking repayment of money; and that Goolden spoke with a New York Post reporter intending to damage Wardak’s reputation and business.

The court emphasized that whether Goolden actually acted with the sole motive of defaming Wardak was a factual question that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The relevant question at this stage was whether Wardak had alleged enough facts to raise that issue plausibly. The court found that he had, so it held that the allegations could not be dismissed as legally privileged as a matter of law.

Disposition

The court denied Goolden’s motion to dismiss Wardak’s defamation counterclaim. The opinion’s opening and analysis identify Goolden as the party who made the motion. The conclusion instead states that “Defendant’s motion to dismiss” is denied, which appears inconsistent with the rest of the opinion. The ruling addressed only whether the counterclaim could proceed past the pleading stage; it did not resolve the truth of the competing allegations or the ultimate merits of the defamation claim.