George v. United States

Background

Robert George was charged in the related criminal case, No. 05-cr-249 (PKC), and pleaded guilty in 2007 to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. The court sentenced him to 204 months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. George completed his prison term, but he remained confined under a civil commitment order entered by the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. Because he remained subject to supervised release, the court concluded that his motion challenging the conviction was not moot.

George, initially representing himself, filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He also filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, a motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, and motions seeking discovery and documents. The court appointed David J. Cohen as counsel. Counsel submitted that George’s § 2255 and coram nobis claims appeared meritless for the reasons stated in the government’s response.

Section 2255 motion

The court stated that George’s § 2255 motion appeared to be filed after the one-year deadline. It assumed, without deciding, that his mental illness might justify equitable tolling, meaning an exception that pauses or extends the filing deadline. The court then addressed the claims on their merits.

The court denied George’s ineffective-assistance claims. To succeed, George had to show both that his lawyer’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard and that the deficient performance harmed his case. The court found neither requirement satisfied.

George argued that counsel failed to object to the drug quantity and to alleged inconsistencies about whether the applicable quantity was 5, 50, or 500 grams. The court found that the superseding indictment, George’s guilty plea, and his statements during the plea hearing established that the charge involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base. The court concluded that no valid objection was available on that basis.

George also claimed that counsel failed to object to a violation of due process, but he did not explain what the alleged violation was. The court found this conclusory claim insufficient. George further argued that counsel improperly allowed him to plead guilty while mentally ill. Before the plea, however, a psychiatric evaluation concluded that George understood the proceedings and could assist in his defense. During the plea hearing, the prior judge questioned George about the charges and the rights he would give up, and found that the plea was voluntary and supported by the facts. The court concluded that counsel was not ineffective for relying on the psychiatric evaluation or for failing to challenge the plea on competency grounds.

Coram nobis petition

The court denied George’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis. This remedy is an extraordinary way to correct a fundamental error in a completed criminal case when other forms of relief are unavailable or inadequate.

George argued that the sentencing court improperly treated him as a career offender based on a nonexistent prior conviction. The court found that the sentencing record did not support this argument: the prior judge had not classified George as a career offender, and the Guidelines calculation did not include a career-offender enhancement.

George also argued that the court lacked a sufficient factual basis to accept his guilty plea. The plea-hearing record showed that he admitted selling crack cocaine with at least one other person and acknowledged that the group sold at least 50 grams. Although he later made statements at sentencing disputing that he had acted with another person, the court found that no fundamental error occurred when the earlier judge accepted the plea as voluntary and factually based. The court also noted that George never formally moved to withdraw the plea.

First Step Act motion

The court denied George’s motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. The court determined that George was eligible to seek relief because he was convicted of an offense involving cocaine base whose statutory drug-quantity thresholds were changed by the Fair Sentencing Act. The court further held that the motion was not moot even though George had completed his prison term, because he remained subject to supervised release and a court could potentially reduce that term.

The court nevertheless found that no reduction was warranted. The statute required at least five years of supervised release for the offense, and George had already received that minimum term. The court therefore denied the First Step Act motion.

Discovery motions and separate complaint

The court denied George’s discovery motions under Rule 6 of the rules governing § 2255 proceedings. Discovery is not automatic in such proceedings; a petitioner must present specific allegations giving the court reason to believe that further factual development could establish entitlement to relief. Because the court found no plausible basis for concluding that additional facts would change the result, it denied discovery.

The court also dismissed George’s pro se submission titled “Common Law Criminal Complaint in the Admiralty for the Perpetration of Kidnapping, Involuntary Servitude & Torture,” which named the Department of Justice and the United States as defendants. It dismissed that submission as frivolous and lacking an arguable basis in fact or law. The court stated that the dismissal did not affect George’s ability to challenge the lawfulness of his continued confinement on a non-frivolous legal and factual basis in the proper district.

Disposition

The court denied George’s § 2255 motion, coram nobis petition, First Step Act sentence-reduction motion, and discovery motions. It dismissed the separate criminal complaint, directed the clerk to close No. 23-cv-9444, declined to issue a certificate of appealability because George had not made a substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied, and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, so permission to appeal without paying filing fees was denied.