Netrebko v. Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc.

Background

Anna Netrebko, an opera singer, sued the Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc., doing business as the Metropolitan Opera, and Peter Gelb. She alleged claims under the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and New York common law. The defendants sought dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Met asked Netrebko to issue a statement denouncing Vladimir Putin. Netrebko had issued statements opposing the war but said she could not make the requested statement as a Russian citizen. The Met then announced that she would not perform in certain seasons and later canceled contracts and future holds. A union arbitration later addressed whether the Met owed her compensation under the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. The arbitrator found that the Met had to compensate her for certain performances covered by formal contracts, but that future holds were not binding contracts.

Netrebko also alleged that the Met and Gelb made public statements portraying her as a Putin supporter and harmed her professional reputation. She claimed that the Met discriminated against her because of her Russian national origin and because she was a Russian woman, while treating male Russian performers with alleged connections to Putin more favorably.

Contract claims

The court granted the motion to dismiss Netrebko’s breach-of-contract claims. It held that claim preclusion, a rule barring a party from relitigating claims that were or could have been resolved in an earlier proceeding, applied because the union arbitration had finally decided the contractual issue involving the holds. The union was in a legally sufficient relationship with Netrebko for this purpose, and the arbitration had presented the issue of whether the holds were enforceable contracts requiring compensation.

The court also stated that, even without claim preclusion, the collective-bargaining agreement required contracts to be in a specified form, such as a Standard Principals Contract, or another approved form meeting specified requirements. The holds did not satisfy those requirements.

National-origin discrimination claims

The court granted the motion to dismiss Netrebko’s national-origin discrimination claims under both New York statutes. It rejected the argument that the Met’s policy was expressly discriminatory because the policy referred to people who supported or were supported by Putin rather than expressly referring to Russians. The court also found that Netrebko had not plausibly alleged that the Met’s stated reason—her perceived support for Putin—was a cover for discrimination against Russian people.

The court further found that identifying non-Russian performers who replaced Netrebko was not enough because the complaint did not adequately allege that those performers were similarly situated, including whether they engaged in comparable conduct involving Putin or political affiliations.

Gender discrimination claims

The court denied the motion to dismiss Netrebko’s gender-discrimination claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. It rejected her theory that the alleged discrimination was inseparably based on the combination of national origin and gender, because the complaint did not adequately plead national-origin discrimination. But the court held that she had plausibly alleged gender discrimination based on the more favorable treatment of male Russian performers whom she said had connections to Putin or the Russian state.

The court concluded that the timing of the firing, public pressure following the invasion, the Met’s effort to demonstrate support for Ukraine, and the alleged uneven application of its policy were sufficient at the pleading stage to support an inference of gender discrimination. The court emphasized that a desire to avoid negative publicity or public pressure does not necessarily make conduct lawful if gender bias also influenced the decision. The NYCHRL claims survived as well because the city law provides at least as much protection as the state law in this context.

Defamation claim

The court granted the motion to dismiss Netrebko’s defamation claim. It treated Netrebko as a public figure, meaning she had to plausibly allege that the defendants acted with “actual malice”—knowledge that a statement was false or reckless disregard for whether it was false.

The court held that Netrebko’s allegations that the Met knew she had made statements opposing the war and distancing herself from Putin did not show that the Met actually believed its statements about her were false. The complaint did not provide sufficiently specific facts showing that Gelb or the Met entertained serious doubts about the truth of the statements. The court also found that bare allegations of ill will were insufficient.

Disposition

The defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted as to Netrebko’s contract, defamation, and national-origin discrimination claims. It was denied as to her gender-discrimination claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. The court stated that Netrebko may proceed on the gender-discrimination theories in the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth causes of action.