Crawford v. Bronx Community College

Background

Caren Crawford represented herself in this employment case. She worked full-time as an office assistant at Bronx Community College from October 2017 until her termination in July 2019. After breaking her ankle on April 17, 2019, Crawford missed work, sought medical leave, and later provided medical paperwork stating that she could return to modified work on May 29 and to unrestricted work on June 12.

Crawford alleged that the college and employees Purysabel Uregar, Alan Fuentes, and Marta Clark treated her absence as unauthorized, prevented her from returning to work on May 29, escorted her from campus, and terminated her employment for “job abandonment” on July 9, 2019. She asserted claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Her claims alleged interference with medical-leave rights, disability discrimination and failure to accommodate, and retaliation.

Procedural History

The defendants moved to dismiss all claims. Magistrate Judge Sarah Cave recommended that the motion be denied in part and granted in part. The defendants objected, but the district court found that their objections largely repeated arguments made in the original motion and therefore reviewed the recommendation for clear error.

Court’s Analysis

Family and Medical Leave Act interference. The court denied the motion to dismiss Crawford’s interference claim. At the pleading stage, Crawford plausibly alleged that she was eligible for leave, gave notice of her need for leave, and was denied benefits to which she was entitled. Although she submitted some forms after the defendants’ deadlines, the court concluded that her allegations—including that the instructions were unclear, that she sought extensions, and that she promptly sought and submitted medical documents—plausibly showed diligent, good-faith efforts to comply.

The court also concluded that Crawford plausibly alleged individual liability for Uregar, Fuentes, and Clark under the Family and Medical Leave Act. The allegations described Uregar’s control over the forms and deadlines, Fuentes’s involvement in Crawford’s return to work, and Clark’s involvement in escorting Crawford from the meeting and sending the termination letter.

Federal disability claims. The court granted the motion as to Crawford’s Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims against Uregar, Fuentes, and Clark, and dismissed those claims with prejudice. Crawford had voluntarily withdrawn those claims because the statutes do not provide for individual liability.

The court also granted the motion as to Crawford’s Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act disability-discrimination claims against the college, but dismissed them with leave to amend. The court held that Crawford had not alleged enough facts to show that her broken ankle substantially limited a major life activity. The court noted that the injury affected her ability to stand and walk for prolonged periods for a limited time, but that the complaint also alleged she could care for herself, use public transportation, commute to work, and return to work with restrictions.

New York disability claims based on adverse employment actions. The court held that Crawford plausibly alleged a qualifying disability under the broader standards of the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. It nevertheless granted the motion as to her claims based on adverse employment actions, including being prevented from returning to work and being terminated. The court found that the complaint did not allege facts supporting an inference that these actions occurred because of her ankle injury. These claims were dismissed with leave to amend.

Failure-to-accommodate claims. The court denied the motion as to Crawford’s New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law claims alleging failure to accommodate. Crawford alleged that she told the college about her injury, requested a defined period of medical leave, and sought to return with modified duties. The court concluded that the medical certification and other allegations plausibly put the college on notice that she was seeking an accommodation and plausibly alleged that the requested leave and modified duties were reasonable. The court also found sufficient allegations that the individual defendants participated in, or aided and abetted, the alleged failure to accommodate.

Retaliation claims. The court largely denied the motion to dismiss Crawford’s retaliation claims. It held that her requests for medical leave and modified duties plausibly constituted protected activity under the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The court also found that the short period between her requests and termination plausibly supported a connection between the protected activity and the termination at the pleading stage.

The court granted the motion as to Crawford’s New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law retaliation claims to the extent they were based on her June 12, 2019 request for Family and Medical Leave Act leave. The court explained that requesting Family and Medical Leave Act leave is not protected activity under those two New York statutes.

Disposition

Judge Gardephe adopted Judge Cave’s Report and Recommendation as modified in the order. The motion to dismiss was granted as to the individual defendants’ federal disability claims, which were dismissed with prejudice; the college’s federal disability-discrimination claims, which were dismissed with leave to amend; the state and city disability claims based on adverse employment actions, which were dismissed with leave to amend; and the state and city retaliation claims based on the June 12 request for Family and Medical Leave Act leave. The motion was otherwise denied. Any motion for leave to amend was due by September 20, 2024.