Barkai v. Nuendorf
- Kenneth Karas
- 7:21-cv-04060
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 5
In Barkai v. Nuendorf, Magistrate Judge McCarthy denied Ariel Dan Barkai’s recusal motion, finding no legally sufficient basis to question the Court’s impartiality.
Ariel Dan Barkai’s request to have the judge recuse herself was denied; the case remained before the Court, with Police Officer Anthony Culianos and Police Officer Kyla Caraballo, sued as Police Officer Kyla Donegan, identified as the remaining defendants.
What happened
Ariel Dan Barkai, representing himself, sued members of the Clarkstown Police Department under a federal civil-rights law. He asked the judge handling the case to step aside, arguing that the Court could not judge him fairly.
The Court applied federal standards requiring recusal when impartiality could reasonably be questioned or when the judge has personal bias or prejudice. It concluded that Barkai’s dissatisfaction with the Court’s rulings and events during the case did not establish either basis for recusal.
Judge Judith C. McCarthy denied Barkai’s motion for recusal and directed the Clerk of Court to mail him a copy of the order.
The detailed version
- Barkai v. Nuendorf · No. 7:21-cv-04060
- Kenneth Karas
- Aug. 23, 2024
Background
Ariel Dan Barkai, proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several members of the Clarkstown Police Department. The opinion states that the only remaining defendants were Police Officer Anthony Culianos and Police Officer Kyla Caraballo, sued as Police Officer Kyla Donegan. Barkai moved for the judge handling the case to recuse herself, meaning to step aside because of alleged concerns about impartiality.
Legal standard
The Court analyzed the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and § 455(b)(1). Section 455(a) requires recusal when an objective, fully informed observer could reasonably question the judge’s impartiality. Section 455(b)(1) requires recusal when the judge has actual personal bias or prejudice against a party. The Court explained that judges’ rulings against a party, and opinions formed from events in the case, generally are not grounds for recusal unless they show deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.
Court’s analysis
The Court found that Barkai had not shown a basis for recusal under either section. Under § 455(a), the Court stated that it had handled the case by trying to apply the law fairly to all parties and that Barkai had not identified a reason why a disinterested observer would reasonably question its impartiality. Under § 455(b)(1), the Court stated that it had no personal bias or prejudice concerning Barkai or any party. The Court acknowledged that Barkai was unhappy with its rulings, but concluded that his disagreements with those rulings and with other events during the case were not legitimate grounds for recusal.
Disposition
The Court denied Barkai’s motion for recusal. It also directed the Clerk of Court to mail a copy of the order to Barkai, who was representing himself.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.