Gleason v. County Of Putnam

Background

Richard Gleason and Mary Gleason sued Putnam County, the Town of Carmel, McLaren Engineering Group, and unidentified defendants. They alleged violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law, and New York state law claims involving an alleged unlawful taking or adverse possession without compensation.

The lawsuit concerned the replacement of the Drewville Road bridge and the detour created while Drewville Road was closed. McLaren served as Putnam’s design engineer. The Gleasons alleged that the detour caused increased commercial and noncommercial traffic, speeding, and unsafe conditions on Fairview Road. They claimed that these conditions limited their ability to walk on their street and safely enter and leave their driveway.

McLaren moved to dismiss the Gleasons’ claims against it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint plausibly states a legal claim. Putnam and Carmel supported McLaren’s motion as to their state-law crossclaims against McLaren.

Court’s analysis

The court dismissed the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims because the complaint did not adequately allege that the Gleasons’ impairments substantially limited a major life activity. The court emphasized that the complaint attributed their difficulty walking and driving to traffic conditions created by the detour, rather than to limitations caused by their medical conditions. The court also found that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that the Gleasons were excluded from walking or driving; instead, it alleged that they could do so only with greater caution or by changing routes.

The court further held that the complaint did not plausibly connect any alleged exclusion to the Gleasons’ disabilities. According to the court, the allegations pointed instead to the detour, dangerous road conditions, speeding, and alleged lack of traffic enforcement as the causes of their difficulties.

The court also dismissed the disability claims against McLaren for additional reasons. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act generally applies to public entities, and the court found that McLaren was a private entity. The Rehabilitation Act claim also failed because the complaint did not allege that McLaren received federal financial assistance.

For the § 1983 claim, the court explained that a plaintiff must allege both a federal-rights violation and action under color of state law. The court found that the complaint did not plausibly allege that McLaren was a state actor. It did not allege that Putnam County or Carmel compelled McLaren’s conduct, establish a sufficiently close connection between McLaren and the municipalities, or show that McLaren performed a function traditionally reserved exclusively to the state. The court concluded that McLaren’s work as a private consultant and its contract with municipalities were insufficient.

Disposition

The court granted McLaren’s motion to dismiss the Gleasons’ First, Second, and Third Causes of Action against McLaren with prejudice. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Gleasons’ state-law claims and Putnam and Carmel’s state-law crossclaims. Those claims were dismissed without prejudice to recommencing them in state court. The court also directed the parties to submit a proposed case-management plan and scheduling order.