Colon v. United States

Background

Jonathan Colon moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure allowing a person in federal custody to ask the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct a conviction or sentence in limited circumstances. Colon had pleaded guilty to attempted Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2. The court later sentenced him to 200 months in prison and three years of supervised release.

Colon’s petition argued that his conviction was invalid under the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Davis and United States v. Taylor. He also argued that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because his trial lawyer coerced him, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise arguments based on those decisions, and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to make similar arguments.

During the plea hearing, Colon told the court under oath that he had read and discussed the indictment and plea agreement with his attorneys, understood his rights and the consequences of pleading guilty, and was pleading guilty voluntarily and of his own free will. He also admitted that he and others planned to use force, threats, violence, or fear to rob a marijuana dealer and that a firearm carried by one of the people with him was fired, killing Christopher Pierce.

Procedural Bar

The court first held that Colon’s claims challenging the validity of his conviction, the voluntariness of his plea, the sentencing firearm enhancement, and the effectiveness of trial counsel were procedurally barred. A procedural bar generally prevents a person from raising a claim in a § 2255 proceeding when the person did not raise it on direct appeal.

Colon’s direct appeal challenged the reasonableness of his sentence, but did not raise the claims presented in his § 2255 petition. The court found that Colon had not shown either legally sufficient cause and actual prejudice for failing to raise those claims earlier or actual innocence. The court also found that Colon’s sworn plea-hearing statements contradicted his assertions that the plea was coerced or that he was innocent.

The court treated the ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim differently because that claim could not logically have been raised on the direct appeal itself. The court therefore addressed that claim on the merits.

Merits Rulings

The court held that Davis and Taylor did not invalidate Colon’s attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction. Davis held that a part of the federal firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), was unconstitutionally vague. Taylor held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under a different provision, § 924(c)(3)(A). According to the court, those decisions concern enhanced penalties for using or carrying a firearm during a qualifying crime; they do not hold that attempted Hobbs Act robbery itself is no longer a valid federal crime under § 1951.

The court rejected Colon’s ineffective-assistance claim against trial counsel under the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington. That test requires a petitioner to show both that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and that the error likely affected the result. The court held that failing to make arguments that would have been meritless was not objectively unreasonable. It also held that Colon had not shown that, absent the alleged errors, he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial.

The court likewise rejected the ineffective-assistance claim against appellate counsel because the proposed arguments under Davis and Taylor would not have succeeded. The court also found that the two-level firearm increase in the sentencing guidelines calculation was supported by Colon’s admissions that a firearm was possessed and used in connection with the offense.

Finally, the court rejected Colon’s claim that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. It relied on his sworn statements that he understood the plea agreement and consequences, was pleading guilty freely, and had not been threatened, promised anything outside the agreement, or subjected to force, coercion, or violence. The court found that his later allegations were conclusory and contradicted the plea-hearing record.

Disposition

Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil denied Colon’s petition for relief in its entirety. The court directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment denying the petition and close the case.