Randhawa v. Otero

Background

Ashley Randhawa brought a negligence action against Sophia Otero and Michael Otero seeking recovery for injuries from a May 16, 2022, collision on the Cross County Parkway in Mount Vernon, New York. Sophia Otero was driving a vehicle owned by Michael Otero with his permission and consent. During a lane change to the right, Sophia’s vehicle struck the rear of Randhawa’s vehicle.

Randhawa described pain and limitations involving her head, neck, and back after the collision. Her treating physician reported range-of-motion limitations and cited an MRI showing multilevel disc bulges. The defendants’ medical expert also measured some range-of-motion limitations but diagnosed sprains or strains, described Randhawa’s prognosis as fair, and reported no disability at the time of the examination. The parties disputed the extent of Randhawa’s limitations and their effect on her work and daily activities.

Motions and Legal Standards

Randhawa moved for summary judgment on liability and on whether she met New York’s statutory “serious injury” threshold. The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment concerning the serious-injury issue. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. At this stage, the court does not weigh competing evidence or decide witness credibility; it determines whether a trial is needed.

Under New York law, a rear-end collision generally creates an initial presumption that the rear driver was negligent. The rear driver can defeat that presumption by presenting a non-negligent explanation, such as an unexpected stop by the vehicle ahead. New York’s no-fault insurance law also generally permits a person injured in a car accident to recover in tort only if the person suffered a legally defined serious injury.

Liability

The parties agreed that a rear-end collision occurred. The defendants argued that Randhawa slowed almost to a stop without warning while traffic was moving steadily, making the collision unforeseeable. Randhawa described heavier traffic and disputed the defendants’ account.

The court held that the evidence created a genuine factual dispute about whether Randhawa’s slowdown was sudden, unexplained, and unforeseeable. Because the defendants offered evidence that could constitute a non-negligent explanation for the collision, Randhawa was not entitled to summary judgment on liability.

Serious Injury: Permanent-Injury Theory

Randhawa claimed that her injuries involved a significant or permanent limitation of a body function. She presented treatment reports recording range-of-motion limitations generally exceeding 20 percent, including reported limitations in cervical and lumbar movement. The court found that this evidence, together with the MRI and some similar measurements by the defendants’ expert, was enough to make an initial showing of a significant injury.

The defendants nevertheless presented evidence creating a triable issue of fact. Emergency-room records described normal range of motion, and later medical evidence indicated an improved prognosis, no disability at the time of examination, and sprain or strain diagnoses. The court also noted inconsistencies in the range-of-motion results. Because both sides presented evidence supporting their positions, the court denied both parties’ motions concerning the permanent-injury claim and left the issue for a jury.

Serious Injury: 90/180-Day Theory

Randhawa also relied on the statutory category covering an injury that prevents a person from performing substantially all of the material acts of usual daily life for at least 90 of the first 180 days after the accident. Her evidence included medical reports describing her as temporarily totally disabled, testimony about difficulty lifting, kneeling, standing, and performing daily activities, and testimony that she could not return to her prior job without restrictions.

The court held that Randhawa had not shown as a matter of law that she was unable to perform substantially all of her regular activities. The court pointed to the general nature of her evidence, the absence of employer documentation, and her return to a different job a couple of months after the accident. At the same time, the defendants also failed to establish as a matter of law that Randhawa did not suffer a 90/180-day injury. Their expert examined her more than a year after the accident and did not address the 180-day period, and the defendants provided no additional sworn medical evidence addressing that period.

Disposition

Judge Kenneth M. Karas denied both motions for summary judgment. The court directed the Clerk to terminate the pending motions and scheduled a status conference for October 9, 2024, at 10:30 a.m. The opinion did not resolve liability or whether Randhawa suffered a qualifying serious injury.