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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Sept. 25, 2024

Alameda v. Association of Social Work Boards

Judge
Kenneth Karas
Docket
7:23-cv-06156
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
17
EmploymentCivil ProcedureMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In Alameda v. Association of Social Work Boards, Judge Karas dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice, allowing 30 days to amend.

Who this affects

Tara Alameda, Kameca Balan, Debbie Hamell-Palmer, the proposed class of similarly situated test takers, and the Association of Social Work Boards.

What happened

In Alameda v. Association of Social Work Boards, Tara Alameda, Kameca Balan, and Debbie Hamell-Palmer claimed that licensing exams developed and scored by the Association of Social Work Boards unfairly harmed African American and Hispanic test takers and affected their social-work employment opportunities. They sued under federal and New York employment-discrimination laws and a federal law against intentional racial discrimination, on behalf of a proposed class.

The court dismissed all three types of claims. It ruled that the Association was not the plaintiffs’ employer or an employment agency, and that the plaintiffs had not alleged that their employers delegated important employment responsibilities to the Association. The court also ruled that the exam statistics did not plausibly show intentional racial discrimination or that race was the necessary cause of the alleged injuries.

Judge Kenneth M. Karas granted the Association’s motion to dismiss in full and dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice. He allowed the plaintiffs 30 days to file another amended complaint addressing the identified problems; otherwise, the dismissed claims could be dismissed with prejudice.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Alameda v. Association of Social Work Boards · No. 7:23-cv-06156
Judge
Kenneth Karas
Date
Sept. 25, 2024

Background

Tara Alameda, Kameca Balan, and Debbie Hamell-Palmer brought a proposed class action against the Association of Social Work Boards (ASWB). They asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The plaintiffs alleged that ASWB’s social-work licensing exams had substantially lower pass rates for African American and Hispanic test takers than for white test takers, and that the plaintiffs had failed the exams multiple times and consequently been unable to obtain or keep satisfactory social-work employment.

ASWB develops, administers, and scores exams used by states to license social workers. It does not issue social-work licenses. In New York, the New York State Department of Education evaluates and decides licensing applications. ASWB moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaint in its entirety under the pleading standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which asks whether the complaint alleges enough plausible facts to support a legal claim.

Title VII claim

The court held that the plaintiffs had not alleged an employment relationship with ASWB. They did not allege that ASWB hired them or paid them benefits for work. The plaintiffs’ own allegations identified other organizations as their employers.

The plaintiffs argued that ASWB could be liable under a third-party interference theory. The court explained that the Second Circuit has recognized a limited version of that theory when an employer delegates one of its core responsibilities to a third party. The plaintiffs did not allege that their employers delegated any core employment responsibility to ASWB. The court also rejected the argument that ASWB was an employment agency because the plaintiffs did not allege that ASWB procured employers or jobs for people taking its exams. The court therefore dismissed the Title VII claim.

NYSHRL claim

The court stated that employment-discrimination claims under the NYSHRL are evaluated under the same approach as Title VII claims and also require an employment relationship. Because the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that relationship under a direct-employment, third-party-interference, or employment-agency theory, the court dismissed the NYSHRL claims.

The plaintiffs also raised an aiding-and-abetting theory for the first time in their opposition to the motion. The court declined to consider it because the amended complaint did not allege that theory. The court further stated that an aiding-and-abetting claim would require a primary NYSHRL violation by an employer or principal, which the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged.

Section 1981 claim

Section 1981 prohibits intentional racial discrimination involving specified contractual rights. The court explained that a plaintiff must allege intentional discrimination and must show that race was the necessary cause of the alleged injury, rather than merely a motivating factor.

The plaintiffs relied primarily on statistics showing different exam pass rates among white, Black, and Hispanic test takers. The court held that these statistics did not plausibly establish intentional discrimination because they did not make other plausible, nondiscriminatory explanations very unlikely. At most, the court said, the allegations suggested a disparate impact, meaning that a practice affected racial groups differently. That alone did not establish the intentional discrimination required for a Section 1981 claim. The court also rejected the argument that ASWB’s continued use of the exams, despite allegedly knowing about unequal pass rates, by itself showed discriminatory purpose. It dismissed the Section 1981 claim.

Disposition

The court granted ASWB’s motion to dismiss in full and dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint. The dismissal was without prejudice because the court concluded that this was the first adjudication on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. The court gave the plaintiffs 30 days to file another amended complaint addressing the identified deficiencies. Any new complaint would replace, rather than supplement, the current amended complaint. If the plaintiffs did not meet the deadline, the dismissed claims could be dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the pending motion.

The authoritative version

Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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