Tyson-Phipps v. Blinken

Background

Jabari-Jason Tyson-Phipps, a diplomatic security special agent employed by the Department of State and a licensed attorney, represented himself in the action. His complaint asserted ten claims. The opinion describes most of them as alleging racial discrimination under federal statutes; other claims alleged violations of the Second Amendment, the First Amendment, other federal statutes, New York State laws, and the New York City Administrative Code. For alleged adverse employment actions, the complaint was expressly limited to six events occurring in 2019, five of them in May.

The defendant moved to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment. The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction and sanctions. Magistrate Judge Gorenstein recommended granting the defendant’s motion with leave to amend and denying the plaintiff’s motion. After the plaintiff objected, the district court reviewed the challenged portions of the recommendation. The court later limited the defendant’s motion to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim; it did not treat the motion as one for summary judgment.

Court’s analysis

The first three claims asserted Title VII claims for disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. The court agreed that the disparate-treatment claim did not allege facts allowing a reasonable factfinder to conclude that any adverse employment action was motivated by racial bias. The court found that most of the remarks relied on by the plaintiff were not alleged to have been made by decision makers involved in the employment actions or during the relevant decision-making process. It also concluded that the plaintiff’s declaration, memorandum exhibits excluded from consideration, and pending, unresolved State Department complaints did not make the complaint legally sufficient.

The court reviewed the hostile-work-environment claim independently and agreed with the recommendation that it be dismissed. The court cited conclusory allegations, comments that were not sufficiently continuous and concerted to alter the conditions of employment, and the absence of factual allegations showing that the other isolated incidents were racially motivated. The court also agreed that the retaliation claim was insufficient for the reasons stated in the recommendation.

The court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims in the second and third claims for relief, and the entire seventh claim, because it concluded that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging employment discrimination based on race and other listed grounds. The court dismissed the fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, and tenth claims for the reasons stated in specified portions of the recommendation. Regarding the sixth claim, the court said those grounds made it unnecessary to address the plaintiff’s extensive attempt to establish a Second Amendment claim. The opinion does not reproduce the full reasoning from those portions of the recommendation.

Disposition

The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint in all respects. It denied leave to amend at that stage because no proposed amended complaint was before the court, but allowed the plaintiff to move for leave to file a proposed amended complaint limited to the Title VII claims. The court stated that amendment concerning the claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Bivens, and the other federal, state, and city statutes would be futile. Any motion for leave to amend had to be filed by November 7, 2024, with a proposed amended complaint and papers printed in at least 12-point type.

The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction as moot and denied the sanctions motion as without merit. Judge Lewis A. Kaplan entered the order on October 8, 2024.