Watson v. Manhattan Luxury Automobiles, Inc. d/b/a Lexus Of Manhattan

Background

An earlier opinion granted in part and denied in part Manhattan Luxury Automobiles, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment. The earlier ruling denied summary judgment on a claim combining Plaintiffs’ Counts 2 and 3 concerning contacts with members of the previously certified National Do-Not-Call Registry class. It also held that, as a matter of law, Defendant did not receive the required consent to contact members of that class and could not raise consent as a defense at trial.

Defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court had misapplied precedent concerning consent. Defendant alternatively argued that consent should be treated as an issue for the jury. The court construed the motion as seeking reconsideration based on clear error.

Consent Documents

The court held that Plaintiffs did not consent, as a matter of law, to being contacted by Defendant. Defendant relied on two documents signed by Plaintiff Espinal. One stated that Honda of Manhattan, referred to as “HOM,” could contact the customer for various purposes, but it did not mention affiliates or tell the customer that consent could be transferred to another entity. The second stated that HOM could disclose customers’ non-public information to third parties and affiliates in certain circumstances. It did not say that those parties could contact the customer, explain what they could do with the information, or include the customer’s telephone number.

The court distinguished the precedent relied on by Defendant because the contract in that case expressly stated that affiliates could offer a specified service and could contact the customer. Here, the documents did not state that HOM could use affiliates to provide services or that affiliates could contact Plaintiffs. The court also declined to consider Defendant’s reliance on a service-warranty document as a new argument that could have been raised earlier. In any event, the court found that the warranty language, which authorized HOM to send non-public personal information to dealer vendors, was insufficient to establish consent to contact by affiliates.

Whether a Jury Should Decide Consent

The court rejected Defendant’s argument that consent was a disputed material fact for the jury. It explained that Defendant had had a full and fair opportunity to address consent in the original summary-judgment proceedings and again in the reconsideration motion. The documents were unambiguous, so their meaning was a legal question for the court rather than a credibility question for a jury.

The court also found that Espinal’s declaration and deposition testimony did not change the result. His declaration stated that he had been required to sign the documents as a condition of purchasing his vehicle and had not checked the box for sales messages because he did not want to consent to those messages from HOM. His deposition testimony largely stated that he did not remember the documents. The court held that neither the testimony nor the declaration created a factual dispute about consent. Defendant remained free to challenge Espinal’s credibility on other matters, including his National Do-Not-Call Registry registration.

Disposition

The court denied Defendant’s motion for reconsideration. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motion at Dkt. No. 277. The supplied opinion does not identify the underlying statutory cause of action beyond describing the relevant claim and the National Do-Not-Call Registry contacts.