Sweigert v. Goodman

Background

D.G. Sweigert brought two actions against Jason Goodman. The cases were consolidated. Sweigert represented himself. He alleged that Goodman, who operated a YouTube channel and other social-media accounts, published insults and statements accusing Sweigert of criminal conduct, including hacking federal-court servers and conspiring with a Michigan law clerk to file fraudulent documents. Sweigert also sued various companies he alleged Goodman owned or operated.

The amended complaints asserted claims for false advertising under the federal Lanham Act and New York General Business Law section 350; deceptive practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act and New York General Business Law section 349; defamation by implication; trade libel; intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress; violations of New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51; vicarious liability; and violations of an Indiana right-of-publicity statute based on statements about Sweigert’s late father.

Goodman moved to dismiss both amended complaints for failure to state a claim. He also sought a nationwide filing injunction barring Sweigert from bringing new cases against him. The court separately denied Goodman’s motion to consolidate a third case because that case had already been dismissed before it was transferred and had no operative complaint.

Claims dismissed or found legally insufficient

The court dismissed the Lanham Act claims with prejudice because the Lanham Act private right of action applies to commercial competitors, and Sweigert did not allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales caused by trademark confusion. The court also dismissed the Federal Trade Commission Act claims with prejudice because, according to the court, that statute provides no private right of action.

The court dismissed the New York General Business Law sections 350 and 349 claims because Sweigert did not allege that he personally paid money or was otherwise deceived by Goodman’s alleged advertising or transactions. He therefore did not plead the concrete injury required for federal standing.

The defamation and trade-libel allegations generally did not satisfy the requirement that a complaint provide a short and plain statement of the claim. The court found that allegations about names such as “Stupid Mario Luigi” were insults lacking objective truth value, and that vague accusations of criminality or online conspiracy theories were non-actionable opinions. Sweigert also did not allege special damages with enough detail or plausibly plead defamation per se for most of the statements. The trade-libel claims were additionally duplicative of the defamation claims and did not allege that the statements harmed the condition, value, or quality of a product or property.

The court dismissed the intentional- or reckless-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because the alleged statements, although crass, did not meet New York’s demanding standard for extreme and outrageous conduct. It dismissed the claim for public disclosure of private facts because New York does not recognize a common-law right to privacy. It rejected the vicarious-liability claims because the complaints did not allege that Goodman was an employee or agent of the companies.

The court also dismissed Sweigert’s Indiana claim concerning his late father’s publicity rights. Sweigert did not allege that Goodman used the father’s publicity rights for a commercial purpose or that the alleged violation occurred in Indiana, as the statute required for a deceased person’s rights.

Claim allowed to proceed

The court denied Goodman’s motion to dismiss Sweigert’s claims under New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51. Those claims alleged that Goodman used Sweigert’s name, photograph, picture, portrait, or likeness without consent to advertise, solicit, and promote Goodman’s business and to induce viewers to pay to view Goodman’s online content. The court held that these allegations stated a plausible claim.

The court also explained that the defamation allegations concerning accusations that Sweigert hacked federal-court servers and conspired to file fraudulent documents could potentially qualify as defamation per se because they accused him of violating federal criminal laws. Nevertheless, the court dismissed those claims without prejudice because the complaints were disorganized and did not provide enough particularity. Sweigert could seek permission to file a consolidated second amended complaint addressing the pleading deficiencies.

Additional relief and disposition

The court denied Goodman’s request for a nationwide filing injunction without prejudice at that time. Although Sweigert had filed numerous unsuccessful lawsuits against various defendants, the court noted that he had filed relatively few against Goodman and that the two complaints had survived the motion to dismiss in part. The court also noted that some claims in an earlier related proceeding had survived summary judgment.

The court stated that Goodman’s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The Lanham Act and Federal Trade Commission Act claims were dismissed with prejudice. Goodman’s motion to dismiss the New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51 claims was denied. The motion to dismiss the remaining claims was granted, and those claims were dismissed without prejudice to Sweigert’s ability to file an amended complaint addressing the identified deficiencies. If Sweigert did not move to amend by October 30, 2024, the remaining claims would be dismissed with prejudice. Judge John G. Koeltl also directed the Clerk to close all pending motions.