Singh v. Meetup LLC

Background

On August 22, 2024, the court granted Meetup LLC and David Siegel’s motion to compel arbitration against Prerna Singh. The court had concluded that Singh failed to allege conduct amounting to sexual harassment under local or state law. As a result, her claims did not fall within the Ending Forced Arbitration Act’s exception for sexual-harassment disputes and remained subject to mandatory arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.

On September 5, 2024, Singh moved for reconsideration. She argued that the court had overlooked differences between the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. She also argued that the conduct alleged in her case qualified as sexual harassment under the state law.

Reconsideration standard

The court described reconsideration as an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. It explained that reconsideration is appropriate only when a party identifies an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, or a clear error or manifest injustice requiring correction.

Singh did not identify a change in controlling law or new evidence. Therefore, the court considered whether she had shown clear error or manifest injustice.

Court’s reasoning

The court first held that Singh’s argument about the state statute’s separate harassment provision could not be raised for the first time on reconsideration. In the earlier briefing, Singh had argued that sex-based unequal treatment itself constituted a sexual-harassment dispute under the federal exception. She had not relied on the state law’s separate harassment provision.

The court also said it would reach the same conclusion even if it considered Singh’s new argument. Although the state statute prohibits harassment because of sex without requiring conduct to be severe or pervasive, the court reasoned that “harassment” must still have a meaning distinct from discrimination. Otherwise, the statute’s separate harassment and discrimination provisions would substantially overlap.

The court concluded that the facts alleged by Singh constituted sex-based disparate treatment, not sexual harassment. It distinguished the cases Singh cited because those cases involved clearly sexual or lewd conduct. The court also considered guidance from the New York Department of Labor and the New York State Division of Human Rights. It found that the latter guidance described sexual harassment as a separate subset of gender discrimination involving sexual, lewd, or romantic conduct.

Ruling

The court held that Singh’s allegations, while described as gender discrimination, did not qualify as sexual harassment under state law for purposes of the Ending Forced Arbitration Act. Her claims therefore did not fall within that Act’s exception to mandatory arbitration.

Judge J. Paul Oetken ruled that Singh had not identified a clear error or manifest injustice. The court denied her motion for reconsideration and directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion at Docket Number 28.