Velasquez, Jr. v. City of Hayward

Background

Steven Velasquez, Jr. brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Hayward and Dynaton Tran, Lawrence La Strape, Bruce Russell, Mark Smith, and Jessenia Torres. He alleged that officers stopped a vehicle in which he was a passenger on January 21, 2023. According to the Second Amended Complaint, officers pointed guns at the occupants, ordered them out, repeatedly hit Velasquez’s head against a patrol-vehicle window, slammed him to the ground after handcuffing him, punched and kicked him, and placed him in a leg lock. He alleged that he was later diagnosed with brain swelling.

The Second Amended Complaint asserted six causes of action: Fourth Amendment excessive force under § 1983; violation of California’s Bane Act; battery; Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure under § 1983; false arrest; and negligence. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally sufficient claim. They also moved under Rule 12(f) to strike the request for punitive damages.

Court’s Analysis

Excessive force and unlawful seizure. The court held that Velasquez’s allegations were enough to state an excessive-force claim in general because repeatedly hitting someone and attacking him while he was handcuffed could potentially be found unreasonable. The court also held that the allegations were enough to state an unlawful-seizure claim because Velasquez alleged that officers pointed guns at him, detained him in handcuffs, used force, and that he was not suspected of committing a crime.

However, both claims were asserted against several individual defendants while the complaint generally referred to “the officer,” “the officers,” or “Defendants.” The court held that § 1983 requires allegations tying each individual defendant to that person’s own conduct; defendants cannot be held liable merely because they were part of a group. The court also found that the complaint did not adequately allege facts showing that particular officers participated in the force, were sufficiently involved in it, or had a realistic opportunity and duty to intervene.

The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the first cause of action for excessive force with leave to amend and granted the motion to dismiss the fourth cause of action for unlawful seizure with leave to amend. The court directed Velasquez to connect specific defendants to specific conduct or use allegations identifying currently unknown officers where appropriate.

Bane Act. The court concluded that Velasquez alleged enough facts to satisfy the Bane Act’s requirements of threats, intimidation, or coercion and specific intent to violate his right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The court nevertheless found the allegations against the defendants impermissibly vague because they were pleaded collectively. It also found that the allegation that defendants acted “in concert/conspiracy” lacked facts showing a prior common plan or design and did not plead conspiracy with the required detail.

The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the second cause of action under the Bane Act with leave to amend. Any amended claim had to identify each defendant’s conduct or use appropriate allegations concerning unidentified officers and plead any conspiracy claim with particularity.

Battery, false arrest, and negligence. The court treated these state-law claims as largely overlapping with the Fourth Amendment claims. Because the complaint did not clearly identify which defendants performed which acts, the court held that dismissal with leave to amend was appropriate on the same basis.

The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the third cause of action for battery, the fifth cause of action for false arrest, and the sixth cause of action for negligence, with leave to amend.

Punitive damages. The defendants argued that the request for punitive damages should be stricken because it was unsupported by facts. The court explained that punitive damages may be available under § 1983 when conduct involves an evil motive or intent, or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights. Although Velasquez had not clearly explained why punitive damages were available against each individual officer, the court found it plausible that he could plead facts supporting such an award. The court therefore denied the motion to strike the punitive-damages request.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with leave to amend and denied defendants’ motion to strike. Velasquez was ordered to file a Third Amended Complaint by December 13, 2024. The opinion does not state that any claim was dismissed with prejudice.