Largan Precision Co, LTD v. Motorola Mobility, LLC.

Background

The parties submitted a joint discovery letter. Motorola moved to compel Largan to produce witnesses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) for depositions in or near San Francisco. Rule 30(b)(6) permits a party to depose an organization through one or more designated witnesses who testify about specified topics.

The parties also disputed whether Motorola should be permitted to depose Largan’s CEO, Adam Lin. Largan argued that Lin was protected by the “apex doctrine,” which concerns whether a high-ranking executive should be required to give a deposition.

The 30(b)(6) Depositions

The court concluded that the dispute about the location of the 30(b)(6) depositions was premature. The parties had not finished meeting and conferring about the number and scope of Motorola’s deposition topics, and Largan had not yet determined who its designated witnesses would be.

The court explained that a plaintiff’s deposition generally is presumed to occur in the district where the plaintiff filed suit. A plaintiff seeking to avoid that location must show undue hardship or exceptional or compelling circumstances. Because the parties had not identified the specific 30(b)(6) witnesses, the court could not evaluate whether such hardship or circumstances existed.

The court denied this portion of the joint letter without prejudice. It ordered the parties to promptly finish discussing the scope of the 30(b)(6) deposition and to discuss deposition locations after Largan designated its witnesses. If disputes remained, the parties could submit a new joint letter under the court’s Standing Order, without incorporating an earlier submission by reference.

Adam Lin’s Deposition

The court found that the parties had not adequately briefed the dispute over Lin’s deposition. The party seeking to prevent a deposition of a high-ranking executive bears the burden of showing good cause. In deciding whether to allow such a deposition, courts consider whether the executive has firsthand knowledge of important, relevant, and material facts and whether the information can be obtained through other discovery or less burdensome methods.

The court concluded that the parties had not adequately addressed whether Lin had the required firsthand knowledge or whether other discovery methods could provide the information Motorola sought. It denied this portion of the joint letter without prejudice and directed the parties to immediately meet and confer under the applicable standard. If the dispute remained, the parties were required to file a standalone joint letter about Lin’s deposition under the court’s Standing Order, without incorporating an earlier submission by reference.

Disposition

Judge Jeffrey White denied without prejudice both portions of the discovery dispute. The order did not decide whether Motorola ultimately may take the depositions or where the depositions must occur.