Dopkins v. Fridley Police Department

Background

Bradford Cain Dopkins brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint named the Fridley Police Department, individual police officers, prosecuting and defense offices, a prosecutor, judges, and other defendants. The court stated that Dopkins was representing himself.

Dopkins had been charged in Minnesota state court with several offenses, including making threats of violence and first-degree assault. He pleaded guilty and received a 117-month prison sentence. The Minnesota Court of Appeals later ruled that his guilty plea to first-degree assault lacked an adequate factual basis, reversed that part of the case, and sent it back so he could withdraw the plea. A state court then vacated the plea, disposition, and decision on the assault count. The opinion stated that the threats conviction remained intact and that the assault charge was still subject to prosecution at the time of the federal court’s decision.

After the federal court directed Dopkins to identify which claims he wanted to pursue, he said he intended to focus on alleged improper searches and seizures and the retention of his property. The property included money, gold, silver, and cryptocurrency. He sought damages of “upwards of $117 trillion each,” although the court said it was unclear how that amount was meant to apply.

Screening and Recommended Dismissals

Because Dopkins applied to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). That statute requires dismissal of an in forma pauperis case, or part of one, that fails to state a legally sufficient claim. The court applied the rule that factual allegations are accepted as true at this stage, while a complaint must contain enough facts to make relief plausible. It also noted that self-represented complaints are read liberally but still must allege sufficient facts.

The court recommended dismissing without prejudice the claims about excessive force during Dopkins’s June 2018 arrest and conditions at the Anoka County Jail because Dopkins had indicated that he did not intend to pursue those claims in this action.

The court also recommended dismissing without prejudice claims that challenged Dopkins’s state criminal prosecutions or convictions. It relied on the favorable-termination requirement from Heck v. Humphrey, which generally prevents a person from using a § 1983 damages claim to undermine a conviction or sentence before that conviction or sentence has been favorably terminated. The court concluded that the threats conviction had not been favorably terminated. It also concluded that the assault matter had not yet reached a favorable termination because the charge could still be prosecuted after the plea was vacated.

The court further recommended dismissing without prejudice claims challenging the initial seizures of property during the investigation. The court reasoned that, as presented, those claims would likely target the validity of the criminal prosecution or conviction. It recommended dismissing defendants who participated only in the initial seizures.

Remaining Property-Retention Claim

The court found that Dopkins could pursue one narrow § 1983 claim alleging that his property was being improperly retained despite his requests for its return. The complaint appeared to allege that the Fridley police department currently held the property.

Because police departments generally are not suable entities, the court construed this remaining claim as one against the City of Fridley. The recommendation stated that all defendants should be dismissed from the action except the “Fridley Police Department,” which would proceed as the City of Fridley itself.

Motions and Required Next Steps

The court granted Dopkins’s application to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. It denied the repossession-related motion. It denied the payment-related motion as moot because Dopkins had later paid the initial partial filing fee.

The court recommended denying the laptop-related motion without prejudice. That motion sought a computer with legal-research access and was treated as a request for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the defendants had not received the notice required for that type of relief.

The court ordered Dopkins to submit a completed Marshal Service Form for the City of Fridley. If he did not return the form within 30 days of the order’s date, the court would recommend dismissing the matter without prejudice for failure to prosecute. The U.S. Marshals Service was directed to serve the City of Fridley. Dopkins was also ordered to pay the unpaid balance of the statutory filing fee, $313.96, through deductions handled under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court ordered the parties to file a joint notice within 14 days if the state charges then being prosecuted reached a resolution, including their positions on how that resolution affected the federal case.

Procedural Status

The document was an order and report and recommendation by United States Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko. Its recommended dismissals and recommended denial of the laptop motion were not directly appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit as a final district-court judgment. The notice allowed a party to file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with the report and recommendation.