M.D. v. Kijakazi

Background

M.D. applied for disability insurance benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. After the application was denied, M.D. challenged the denial in federal court. M.D. moved for summary judgment, arguing that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated two medical opinions, discredited M.D.’s statements about symptoms, and rejected a third-party witness statement. The Commissioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

In the earlier merits ruling, the court granted M.D.’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The court found that the administrative law judge had erred in weighing medical opinions, evaluating M.D.’s symptom testimony, and discounting third-party testimony. Judgment was entered on August 2, 2024.

Attorney’s-Fee Application

M.D. then sought attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The Commissioner filed a notice of non-opposition, but the court independently reviewed the request.

Substantial Justification

The Equal Access to Justice Act generally requires an award of reasonable fees and expenses to a prevailing party in an action against the United States unless the government’s position was substantially justified or special circumstances would make an award unjust. “Substantial justification” requires a reasonable basis in both law and fact.

The court found that the government’s position was not substantially justified. The administrative law judge’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence and contained reversible legal errors, including errors in evaluating medical opinions and in discounting M.D.’s symptom testimony and lay-witness testimony. The court also found that the Commissioner’s decision to defend the administrative decision in court was not substantially justified. The Commissioner did not present a counterargument on substantial justification.

Prevailing-Party Status, Eligibility, and Timeliness

Because the court entered judgment for M.D. and remanded the case under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), M.D. was a prevailing party for purposes of the fee statute, regardless of whether benefits would ultimately be awarded. The court also found that M.D.’s net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 when the action was filed, making M.D. otherwise eligible for fees and costs. The application was timely because it was filed within the applicable period after the time for appealing the judgment ended.

Reasonableness of the Request

The court approved the requested hourly rate of $244.62, the Ninth Circuit’s adjusted statutory maximum rate for 2023 and 2024. The court also found that the time spent by M.D.’s attorney, Katherine Siegfried, was reasonable. Siegfried reported spending at least 38 hours litigating the case, including reviewing the administrative record, preparing M.D.’s summary-judgment motion, and responding to the Commissioner’s cross-motion. The court noted that the record was extensive, the motion presented three distinct arguments with detailed subparts, and there was no indication of redundant, unnecessary, or clerical billing. The fee request covered approximately 37.1 hours rather than the full 38.1 hours listed on the invoice.

Ruling

The court granted M.D.’s application for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act and awarded $9,075.38 in attorney’s fees. The supplied opinion text does not clearly identify the judge’s name in the signature.