Zimmerman v. Banks

Background

Rachel Zimmerman brought the action individually and on behalf of her grandchild, H.W., against David C. Banks and the New York City Department of Education, collectively referred to in the opinion as the DOE. She sought to enforce Findings of Fact and Decision (FOFD) issued by an Impartial Hearing Officer under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

H.W. is a six-year-old child with a traumatic brain injury, encephalitis, spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy, and other significant disabilities. H.W. is non-verbal, non-ambulatory, receives nutrition through a G-tube, and is classified as a child with a disability under the IDEA. Zimmerman placed H.W. at the International Institute for the Brain, a private school, for the 2021–2022 and 2022–2023 school years and contracted with Sisters Travel and Transportation Services, LLC, for transportation.

After Zimmerman filed an administrative complaint, the hearing officer found that the DOE had failed to provide H.W. with a free appropriate public education for both school years. The FOFD found the private placement appropriate and ordered the DOE to pay iBrain up to $65,041.60 for related services for 2021–2022 and up to $108,158.40 for 2022–2023, after submission of invoices. It also ordered the DOE to pay the Transportation Company up to $320 per trip for 2021–2022 and $345 per trip for 2022–2023, after submission of invoices. The DOE had paid the tuition and nursing-service amounts, which were not at issue in this case.

Issues and analysis

Two issues remained. First, the parties disagreed about whether the transportation provisions required payment for all contracted school days or only days when H.W. attended school in person and actually used transportation. Second, they disagreed about whether Zimmerman had submitted the documentation required for reimbursement of related services.

The court explained that the IDEA did not itself resolve the scope of the DOE’s payment obligations in these circumstances. The FOFD was therefore the source of those obligations, and the court interpreted its language using contract-interpretation principles. The court concluded that the transportation language—payment at a specified amount “per trip”—was ambiguous. It could plausibly mean payment only for trips actually taken, as the DOE argued, or payment under the transportation contract, as Zimmerman argued. Because the FOFD did not clearly require payment for all transportation costs or limit payment to services actually provided, the court remanded the transportation issue to the hearing officer for clarification.

Regarding related services, the court held that the FOFD unambiguously required submission of invoices. Zimmerman’s motion papers cited only the complaint and FOFD and did not provide admissible evidence showing that she had satisfied that requirement. Documents later submitted with her reply showed prospective costs matching the FOFD amounts, but they were not invoices for services actually rendered or amounts actually paid.

Rulings

The court denied Zimmerman’s motion for summary judgment. It denied without prejudice both parties’ motions for summary judgment as they concerned transportation reimbursement and remanded that issue to the hearing officer for clarification. It denied without prejudice Zimmerman’s motion for summary judgment concerning related services. It granted the DOE’s motion for summary judgment on that issue to the extent that Zimmerman’s requested relief was denied without prejudice. The clerk was directed to enter judgment remanding the case to the hearing officer, close the case, and close the pending motions.

The conclusion refers once to remanding the case to the “THO,” but the opinion’s discussion and other references identify the relevant officer as the IHO, or Impartial Hearing Officer.